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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans love to put labels on blocks of time. We experienced the
Gay Nineties,' the Roaring Twenties, the Great Depression, and the
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor, Regent University School of Law. B.A. 1980, summa cum
laude, University of Delaware; J.D. 1983, University of Chicago Law School. I
thank Dean Jeffrey A. Brauch and Regent University School of Law for their sup-
port in preparing this Article, and Natalie Kirk, Regent class of 2004, for excel-
lent research assistance. Special thanks to Sam Casey, Rick Duncan, John
Tuskey, and David Wagner for their helpful comments on a working draft. All
mistakes that remain are mine.
1. In the 1890s, of course, "gay" referred to happiness or merriment, not sexual
preference.
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days of the Greatest Generation.2 We have lived through the Age of
Aquarius, 3 the Pepsi Generation,4 and the Me Generation. 5 We re-
member the Reagan Years and the Clinton Years (and most of us
loved one or the other, but not both). Today, we might be standing on
the brink of the New Age,6 the Millennium, 7 or the New World Order.8
For lawyers who specialize in the law of religious liberty, the years
from 1990 to 2000 were the "Lobbying Nineties"-a decade of legisla-
tive battles over free exercise of religion. With bookends on April 17,
1990 (the date of the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Divi-
sion, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith9), and Sep-
tember 22, 2000 (the day on which President Clinton signed the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA")1o
into law), the 1990s saw a dramatic series of federal and state legisla-
tive battles to restore some of the legal protection for religious practice
that the Supreme Court had taken away. The politics were fascinat-
ing, with unexpected alliances creating some of history's strangest po-
litical bedfellows.11 With RLUIPA's passage in the summer of 2000, a
long-forgotten calm settled over the sea of church-state advocacy. At
least pending the Supreme Court's next foray, there appear to be no
new federal legislative battles to fight.12 Has all been done that could
be done? Or are there, perhaps, other possible ways that Congress
could act to promote religious freedom?
Parts II and III of this Article present a simple analytical frame-
work for thinking about free exercise doctrine, and a brief summary of
the Supreme Court's free exercise case law leading up to the Smith
2. TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION (1998).
3. From the 1968 Broadway musical Hair, by composer Galt MacDermot and libret-
tists Gerome Ragni and James Rado.
4. Pepsi-Cola mass-marketing campaign in the mid-1960s: "Come Alive! You're in
the Pepsi Generation." There is an urban legend, the factual basis for which is
uncertain, that this slogan was mis-translated as something like "Pepsi brings
your ancestors back from the grave" when the campaign was exported to China.
See, e.g., WEST'S BUSINESS LAW 181 (7th 1998).
5. See, e.g., Harlan Jacobson, JFK, Jr. and the Me Generation (WFUV-FM radio
broadcast July 22, 1999), transcript available at http://www.talkcinema.coml
reviews/jfkjr.html (explaining that "Gen X" came to supplant the phrase "Me
Generation").
6. See New Age Web Works, http://www.newageinfo.com (last visited Feb. 14, 2006).
7. Revelation 20:1-6; see also TIM LAHAYE & JERRY B. JENKINS, LEFr BEHIND (1995)
(the first of what is popularly known as the Left Behind series).
8. PAT ROBERTSON, THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1992).
9. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
10. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, Pub L.
No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000).
11. See infra Part IV.
12. At least no comprehensive religious freedom battles along the lines of RFRA,
RLPA, and RLUIPA. There may be ongoing legislative challenges dealing with
specific religious freedom issues. In addition, state-level policy-making on relig-
ious liberty, including some efforts to enact new state RFRAs, continues.
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decision.13 Part IV recounts the story of the legislative battles over
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"),14 the Religious Lib-
erty Protection Act ("RLPA"),15 and RLUIPA, told from the perspec-
tive of one who worked as an advocate for-or against, but for reasons
unrelated to the desire to protect religious freedom-each of those
bills. In Part V, I examine the question, "Where could we go from
here?" Are there any legislative avenues, as yet untried, that might
be fruitful in the ongoing effort to protect the right of Americans to
live in accordance with their religious convictions?
II. A SIMPLE FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT
THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
When one begins to examine free exercise doctrine-as is often the
case in the field of constitutional law-it is easy to get bogged down in
complicated tests, tiers, and levels of scrutiny. 16 However, I believe
that the core issues involved are not so difficult to understand. When
I introduce law students or non-legally-trained audiences to the Free
Exercise Clause,17 I try to give them a simple, but hopefully not sim-
plistic, analytical framework to understand what is going on in the
cases and legislative battles.
13. The discussion of the cases is abbreviated because so much has already been writ-
ten by others about Smith and free exercise. See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, A
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409 (1990);
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism].
14. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488.
15. Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA) of 1998, H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. 57-62; S.
2148, 105th Cong. 57-62 (1998). RLPA died in the Senate in 2000; RLUIPA took
its place.
16. The United States Supreme Court merits considerable blame for this constitu-
tional confusion, because the Court "corrupts the plain-spoken words of a docu-
ment intended to be accessible to all, and to belong to all, by adding a venire of
pseudo-sophisticated legalese. This corruption serves to distance the people from
their Constitution by rendering it inaccessible to common understanding."
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitu-
tional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals From the Twenty-Third Century, 59
ALB. L. REV. 671, 674 (1995).
17. Yes, I know that scholars as diverse as Stephen L. Carter, Richard John Neu-
haus, Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., and former Chief Justice Warren Burger have
argued persuasively that the First Amendment contains a single "Religion
Clause" rather than a Free Exercise Clause and a Non-Establishment Clause.
However, since most people still tend to split them, and since my focus in this
Article is on government treatment of private religious conduct rather than situa-
tions where the government is arguably promoting or establishing a church or
religion, I will stick with the common terminology.
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We start with the language of the First Amendment: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof."l 8 Although the First Amendment itself
is only a restriction on the activities of Congress, the concept of free
exercise has been incorporated into the substantive reach of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,19 so that today, for all
practical purposes, the Constitution provides: "No arm of national,
state, or local government within the United States shall establish
any religion or prohibit the free exercise of religion." So far, pretty
elementary.
Now it gets more interesting: just what does it mean to say that
government shall not "prohibit the free exercise of religion"? It sounds
like a clear, absolute command-but is it really? At this point, a sim-
ple visual tool can help. Picture a line like a time line or a number
line:
This line represents the range of possible meanings for the legal pro-
tection for religious practices. At the left end of the line2O is the mini-
mal meaning of constitutional protection for religion. We can label
this view, "Belief Only."
Belief
Only
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 & 2.
19. There is, of course, some level of disagreement among scholars and practitioners
as to whether the incorporation doctrine makes sense, whether the authors of the
Fourteenth Amendment believed that fundamental individual rights would be
protected against state incursion by the Due Process Clause (as opposed to the
"Privileges or Immunities" Clause of the same amendment), and whether "sub-
stantive due process" is an oxymoron. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("If I thought that 'substantive due process' were a
constitutional right rather than an oxymoron, I would think it violated by bait-
and-switch taxation."); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Judge Posner calling "substantive due process" the "ubiquitous oxymoron"). For
present purposes, I am not going to take issue with the incorporation of free exer-
cise doctrine against the states. On the other hand, it makes absolutely no sense
to say that the Non-Establishment Clause, a federalism provision designed to
prevent the national government from interfering with state religious establish-
ments, has now been incorporated against the states, see Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment),
but this is not a non-establishment Article, so we will save that argument for
another day.
20. "Left" and "right" on this line are chosen arbitrarily without any political conno-
tations. As we will see, the battle for free exercise has cut across the usual con-
servative-liberal political divisions in unexpected ways.
[Vol. 84:795
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Everyone agrees that the right to religious exercise must include-
at a very minimum-the right to hold whatever religious beliefs one
chooses, without the government imposing any sanctions or penalties
based on the truth or falsity of those purely internal beliefs. 2 1 The
government has no institutional competence to mandate or forbid be-
lief in Christianity (Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox), Judaism, Is-
lam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Rastafarianism, Santeria, Wicca,
Satanism, or any other set of religious beliefs. However, the right to
believe as one chooses does not necessarily include the right to take
any actions based on those beliefs, when the actions involve conduct
that would, lacking the religious motivation, violate other legal
standards.
It is not hard to see that if Belief Only is the correct meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause, the protection does not amount to much-not
nothing, perhaps, but still not much. It is conceivable that, absent the
First Amendment, an American political majority might develop such
hatred to some set of religious beliefs that even identifying oneself as
a holder of those beliefs-without any specific religiously-motivated
conduct-would result in prosecution or persecution. In such a case,
even a Belief Only Free Exercise Clause would be a benefit to the un-
popular believer. In most cases, however, government action against
a particular religious group is directed not at the beliefs themselves,
but at conduct motivated by the beliefs. 2 2 Belief Only would provide
no comfort in this vast majority of cases.
The other end of the "free exercise line" is the interpretation re-
quiring that all religiously-motivated conduct must be exempted from
otherwise applicable laws. This would be the logical consequence of
Justice Black's absolutist "no law means no law" approach to the First
21. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
877 (1990); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
22. For example, consider all of the legal actions that attacked unpopular religious
groups such as the Mormons and the Jehovah's Witnesses, not by outlawing the
religious beliefs, but by targeting conduct mandated by those religions. Watch-
tower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (literature dis-
tribution by Jehovah's Witnesses); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (conscientious pacifism by Jehovah's Witnesses);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (literature distribution by Jeho-
vah's Witnesses); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled
by W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (conscientious objec-
tion by Jehovah's Witnesses to forced recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance); Mar-
tin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (literature distribution by Jehovah's
Witnesses); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (same); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (same); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)
(same); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (polygamy practiced by Mormons); Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333 (1890) (same); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (same).
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Amendment:23 if the government may not make laws "prohibiting the
free exercise of religion," and if religious exercise includes all conduct
motivated by one's religious beliefs, then the government may not en-
force any legal requirement that stops an individual from fulfilling his
or her religious duties, as understood by the religious believer. The
paradigm case here would involve religious human sacrifice. If it is
my sincere religious belief that God (or Allah, or the Goddess, or
whatever it is that I worship) has commanded me to sacrifice virgins
by burning them alive on an altar, the government would be required
to maintain a no-interference posture with respect to this religious ex-
ercise. "No law prohibiting the free exercise of religion," under this
approach, would mean that the government could not stop me from
acting in accordance with my sincerely-held religious beliefs, no mat-
ter what consequences to other people.
Belief Human
Only SacrificeI I
Just as it is easy to see that the Belief Only position would be
pretty close to a zero in protecting religious liberty, you need not be a
rocket scientist to realize that the "Human Sacrifice" position is not
workable. If every individual gets to decide for himself which laws to
follow and which to ignore, based solely on individual religious convic-
tions, anarchy has an open field. As Justice Scalia said in Smith, "per-
mitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself...
contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense."24 I
think it is safe to assume that no one wants to live in a world where
any individual may self-exempt from all laws of society because of re-
ligious conviction.
When you consider it in this context, it becomes pretty clear that
the law of free exercise of religion presents a line-drawing problem:
where, on the spectrum between Belief Only and the place where vir-
gins die on the altar without consequence, does the Free Exercise
Clause cut off the government's ability to prohibit individuals from
obeying their religious convictions? If you believe, as I do, that neither
the text of the First Amendment nor any discernable evidence of the
23. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717-18 (1971) (Black, J., concur-
ring) (quoting the government's oral argument asserting that it is well-known
that Justice Black's approach to the First Amendment is that "no law means no
law"). This is not to suggest that Justice Black either would or would not have
followed the logic of his position to this extreme. One can only hope not.
24. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. I agree with Justice Scalia that permitting every relig-
ious believer to become a law unto himself would be a horrible, and legally unten-
able, state of affairs. I disagree with his conclusion that pre-Smith free exercise
law applying the compelling interest test created that state of affairs.
800 [Vol. 84:795
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intent of those who enacted it leads to either of these extreme conclu-
sions as to its meaning, then we can hope that the correct meaning of
the Free Exercise Clause embodies a sensible balance that permits re-
ligious freedom to flourish without permitting anarchy. Where is that
line located? Most of us, I think, have an intuitive sense that some
free exercise claims (like that of parents to educate their own children
in their religious values) ought to succeed, but that others (like an
inmate's claim that his religious diet calls for steak at every meal, or a
tax evader's argument that paying taxes is a mortal sin) ought to fail.
How can free exercise of religion be understood so as to separate the
wheat from the chaff?25
In trying to answer these questions, I operate from the assumption
that more legal protection for individual religious conduct is always
better than less. I believe that an expansive understanding of the
right to free exercise, minimizing the occasions on which the govern-
ment may prohibit individuals from practicing their faith, is the cor-
rect understanding both textually and historically. 26 Now, it is
certainly possible to imagine a different legal world, in which religion
has too much protection-for example, a world in which religiously-
motivated human sacrifice is protected and innocent victims die. In
this case, we would all agree that "religion" has too free a reign and
that there must be some movement in the direction of Belief Only. In
reality, however, my years of working and studying in the area of re-
ligious liberty law suggest that this is never a problem. All of the po-
litical and social pressures go the other way, i.e., toward too little
protection for religious freedom, rather than too much. Therefore, in
the real world I assume that it is always a good thing to stay toward
the right end of my graphic line, seeking as much protection as possi-
ble for the individual's ability to act on his or her religious convictions
without government interference. Thus, when we see the Smith deci-
sion eliminate the compelling interest test and move the meaning of
the Free Exercise Clause much closer to Belief Only, I view it as a bad
thing; and when we see legislative efforts like RFRA, RLPA, and
RLUIPA trying to move the test back to the right end of the line, I
view them, in general, as good things. 27
There are some possible ways to avoid, or at least minimize, the
problem of protecting more than Belief Only without going all the way
to religious anarchy. One line of restricting free exercise claims that
is always available to the government is sincerity analysis. The right
25. Matthew 13:24-30.
26. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 13.
27. Although I worked in opposition to RLPA in 1998-99 because of its use of the
commerce power and the implications of that power for issues of federalism and
expansive national government, I was always in full agreement with the free ex-
ercise goals of the legislation. See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
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to free exercise of religion presumes that the alleged religious belief is
"sincerely held."28 Therefore, in defending a free exercise claim, the
government always has the option of attempting to prove that the
claimed religious belief is a sham. However, proving that someone
does not believe something is problematic under most circumstances,
so the claim of insincerity has rarely been upheld even when the
claimed religious belief is pretty outlandish.2 9
Another possibility, interesting and worthy of discussion but be-
yond the scope of this Article, is that of requiring not merely a burden,
but some serious or substantial burden on religious practice before a
free exercise claim can be raised. A number of scholars have explored
this concept,3 0 and the "substantial burden" limitation, although not
initially a part of RFRA, was inserted into the final version of the
bill3l and carried over into the text of RLPA and RLUIPA.
There is another theoretical strategy to move free exercise protec-
tion away from Human Sacrifice but not all the way to Belief Only.
This is an approach which the Supreme Court has never pursued and
which few lawyers and scholars today are willing to advocate: putting
some substantive restrictions around the meaning of "religion."3 2 Per-
haps the reason why vigorous protection for the right of free exercise
seems problematic to so many people (including a majority of the Su-
preme Court Justices) today is our societal loss of any constrained,
manageable definition of "exercise of religion." Should "exercise of re-
ligion" be understood in a more limited way, so that it includes resting
on one's Sabbath33 and teaching the faith to one's children,3 4 but ex-
cludes chewing peyote3 5 and sacrificing animals?36 This would leave
views that do not fit the definition of "religion" outside the protection
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It would protect the virgins
from the human sacrificers on the understanding that a belief that one
must kill virgins is not the kind of religion that the First Amendment
was designed to protect. Depending on how broadly one defines "relig-
28. Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989); see also Hobbie
v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144 n.9 (1987) (dis-
missing argument that timing of and reasons for religious conversion are impor-
tant when employee is converted after being hired); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("honest conviction"); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
30. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 933 (1989).
31. See infra note 115.
32. See Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution of Issues About Religious Conviction,
81 MARQ. L. REV. 461, 463-65 (1998).
33. Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
34. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
35. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
36. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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ion,"37 this might move the test a little bit away from the Human Sac-
rifice position, if the definition of religion includes all but a tiny
number of truly bizarre beliefs.
Belief Broadly Define Human
Only Religion Sacrifice
Or it might locate it almost all the way to Belief Only, if only a few
religious believers were entitled to substantive protection for their
activities.
Belief Narrowly Define Human
Only Religion Sacrifice
I I I
The problem here, of course, is the question of the institutional in-
competence of the courts, or any other agency of government, to distin-
guish true religion from false religion. Few would disagree with the
premise that if the government gets to define religious orthodoxy,
there is a great danger that it will do a poor job of it; indeed, this is
generally considered to be one of the most foundational principles un-
derlying the religion clauses of the First Amendment.38
Beyond the rarely-used practice of evaluating religious sincerity,
and the rejected approach of evaluating whether various belief sys-
tems are "religious" for constitutional purposes, most efforts to give
content to the Free Exercise Clause have focused on a substantive test
to be applied when a court determines that government action has
substantially interfered with religiously-motivated conduct, in order
to balance, somehow, the religious liberty claim against the govern-
ment's desired goal. Once again, depending on the test that is chosen,
the line could be very close to Belief Only, very close to the Human
Sacrifice extreme, or somewhere in the middle. To see where various
tests have fallen on the line, we will turn our attention to the Supreme
Court case law.
37. For example, religion might narrowly include only various versions of Christian-
ity, which is what most Americans thought of as true "religion" at the time of our
nation's founding, see, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1865-73 (1833), or it might be more broadly defined to
include any belief system based on belief in God or some kind of supreme being or
higher power.
38. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (explaining that inquiry into the
truth or plausibility of a religious belief is "forbidden domain" for the courts).
Several cases involving the draft and conscientious objectors have discussed this
point. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United Sates v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965); see also Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'r, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir.
1987); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
2006] 803
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III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FREE EXERCISE
CASE LAW HISTORY
For the first 150 years or so of our nation's history, the Supreme
Court had few opportunities to apply the Free Exercise Clause, for
reasons that seem fairly clear:
(1) Prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment with its
Due Process Clause, "Congress shall make no law" meant what it
says. The Free Exercise Clause was only a limitation on the na-
tional government, not the states, 39 so any state or local govern-
ment actions interfering with religious practice were immune
from federal constitutional challenge.
(2) Our nation's central government, which was subject to the limita-
tions of the First Amendment, was much more in line with the
Framers' view of limited, enumerated powers than it has been
since the 1930s. There was no "nanny state"40 and no network of
federal regulatory bureaucracies.41 Therefore, there were rela-
tively few actions by the national government which had the po-
tential to infringe on the religious activities of citizens.
In the first major free exercise case, Reynolds v. United States,42
the Court rejected the claim of a Mormon convicted of bigamy that the
federal criminal statute against multiple marriages violated the Con-
stitution when applied to one whose church taught that polygamy was
a religious duty. The Court did not verbalize any clear test for evalu-
ating a free exercise claim, but rather seemed to suggest that the Free
Exercise Clause would not ever permit an individual to be freed from
the requirements of the law because of his religious beliefs:
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of
the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed.
Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief?
To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become
a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such
circumstances.
4 3
Why did the Supreme Court show so little interest in protecting
religious liberty? It is only a guess, but my own sense is that what the
Court was really doing in Reynolds, without admitting it, was a form
of narrowing the constitutional definition of protected "religion," as
39. Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845).
40. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Con-
tractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 856 (1997) (book review).
41. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only From a National
Perspective) For Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
225, 256 (1997).
42. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
43. Id. at 166-67.
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discussed above. 44 In the 1870s the Mormon church was a little too
weird for the Supreme Court to accept as a mainstream religion, and
polygamy just did not seem like the kind of religious practice that the
Constitution was intended to protect. If a more mainstream church
had suffered prohibition of a more commonplace religious practice,
perhaps the Court would have been more protective.
If this analysis was not the case-if the 1879 Supreme Court really
intended Reynolds as a comprehensive statement of the meaning of
free exercise in those days-then it is difficult to see the Free Exercise
Clause as including much more than Belief Only in the thinking of
that time.
Belief Human
Only Reynolds v. U.S. Sacrifice
The Court first "incorporated" the Free Exercise Clause against the
states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Cantwell v. Connecticut.4 5 In Cantwell, the Supreme Court over-
turned the Connecticut criminal convictions of three members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses who were arrested for solicitation without a per-
mit when they went door-to-door in a primarily Catholic New Haven
neighborhood distributing religious materials, asking for donations,
and playing a record that attacked the Catholic church. The Court
found that this statute, as applied to religious believers, violated the
Free Exercise Clause. It is clear that free exercise had more teeth in
Cantwell than it had in Reynolds; however, the Court's free exercise
discussion still left lots of ambiguity as to how future cases would be
decided:
Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and free-
dom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second can-
not be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.
The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforce-
ment of that protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so exer-
cised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected
freedom. No one would contest the proposition that a State may not, by stat-
ute, wholly deny the right to preach or to disseminate religious views. Plainly
such a previous and absolute restraint would violate the terms of the guaran-
tee. It is equally clear that a State may by general and non-discriminatory
legislation regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its
streets, and of holding meetings thereon; and may in other respects safeguard
the peace, good order and comfort of the community, without unconstitution-
ally invading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
4 6
The Court seemed to say that the free exercise test is whether the
government action "unduly" infringes on religious conduct. What does
44. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
45. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
46. Id. at 303-04 (footnotes omitted).
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"undue" mean? It is not clear, but it appears that the Court struck a
balance between Reynolds and absolute protection.
Belief Human
Only Reynolds v. U.S. ?? Cantwell v. Conn. Sacrifice
I I I I
So up until around 1960, we could know that the Constitution had a
Free Exercise Clause, and that the Clause binds federal, state, and
local governments, but the actual content of that Clause-the place on
our line where free exercise falls-was quite murky.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court finally began to give
real definition to the concept of free exercise of religion; for the first
time, the Court gave clear evidence as to where on our line the test
would be measured. In cases such as Sherbert v. Verner,4 7 Wisconsin
v. Yoder,48 and Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Se-
curity Division,49 the Court made it clear that free exercise cases were
to be evaluated under a strict scrutiny standard: a government action
interfering with religious exercise would only be sustained if the gov-
ernment was pursuing a "compelling interest" (i.e., a truly essential
end), and even then only if the government's action was the "least re-
strictive means" of accomplishing that interest (i.e., only if there was
no other way of achieving the government's compelling end without
the interference with religious liberty).50 This created a very high
standard for religious liberty protection, but not all the way over to
Human Sacrifice, since the government always has a compelling inter-
est in preserving the lives of innocent people. There are certain sets of
means and ends that the federal government and the states may pur-
sue even if individual religious freedom is harmed, because the needs
of society are so great. However, in developing its free exercise juris-
prudence, the Court made it clear that the bar that the government
had to clear to win a free exercise case was quite high; if there was a
way to avoid violations of individuals' religious freedom, the govern-
ment was required to pursue it.
Belief Human
Only Reynolds v. U.S. ?? Cantwell v. Conn. CSIILRM 5 1 Sacrifice
I I I I
47. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
48. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
49. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
50. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221-36; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
51. I will use CSIILRM as shorthand for the Compelling State (or Government)
Interest/Least Restrictive Means test.
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As the Supreme Court decided new free exercise cases through the
1980s, it began to appear that although the rhetoric of the CSI/LRM
test was lofty and powerful, signaling the highest level of constitu-
tional protection for this most important of human freedoms, the
Court may not have been applying the test with all the force that it
deserved. In a series of cases, the Court either found some reason why
it should apply some lesser standard than CSJILRM in evaluating a
free exercise claim because of the special circumstances of the case,5 2
or else claimed to be applying the CSI/LRM test but found government
interests to be compelling in circumstances that seemed to most ob-
servers to be less than essential.5 3
However, the powerful protection of the CSI/LRM test for religious
freedom was still doing its job, even when the Supreme Court lacked
courage in its application. Most lawsuits do not make it to the United
States Supreme Court, but are decided in state courts and lower fed-
eral courts-and in those courts, bound by the Supreme Court's estab-
lished substantive rule rather than by the Court's recent tepid
applications of that rule, many free exercise cases had positive out-
comes during the thirty-year54 Golden Age of CSJILRM.55
Even more helpful for religious believers was the fact that many
disputes could be resolved favorably pre-litigation because govern-
ment officials knew that they could not prevail in court unless they
52. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447-53
(1988) (holding that the CSI/LRM test is not required when individual American
Indians claim that their religious practices will be prohibited by the federal gov-
ernment building a paved road on its own land); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342, 348-50 (1987) (holding that the reasonableness standard, rather than
the CSIILRM test, applies to free exercise claims by prisoners); Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986) (holding that the government's interest in the internal
operations of the Social Security system overrides a citizen's religious objection to
having a Social Security number); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-10
(1986) (holding that the military's interest in structure and uniformity supports
regulations that prohibit a Jewish Air Force officer from wearing a yarmulke
while on duty).
53. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-60 (1982) (holding that Amish employer's
religious objection to the Social Security system triggers CSI/LRM scrutiny, but
the government's interest in maintaining uniformity in the Social Security sys-
tem is compelling).
54. To be accurate, only twenty-seven years passed from Sherbert in 1963 to Smith in
1990.
55. Consider, for example, the fact that the Supreme Court's decisions in Bowen,
O'Lone, Lyng, and Lee all reversed lower court decisions in favor of the religious
claimants. See also, e.g., Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'd
by an equally divided Court, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (holding that state's interest in
driver's license uniformity was not sufficiently compelling to prevail over an indi-
vidual's religious objection to her photograph appearing on her license); Int'l
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding
that the state may not require a religious group to comply with a general rule
limiting solicitation of funds at the state fair to purchasers of booths).
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could prove a compelling interest and narrowly tailored means. When
I went to work as a staff attorney in Christian Legal Society's ("CLS")
Center for Law and Religious Freedom in 1988, one of my duties was
to respond to mail and phone calls from people around the country
with questions about religious liberty issues. Many of these were
along the lines of the old "the principal won't let little Jimmy wear his
'Jesus Loves You' t-shirt to school" problem. Almost all of these dis-
putes were quickly and favorably resolved by a phone call or, at most,
a letter to the school district's attorney pointing out that if the case
went to court, his client would have to prove a compelling interest and
least restrictive means. Few lawyers were brave or stupid enough to
make a fight out of it. From the 1960s until 1990, a Golden Age of free
exercise of religion indeed reigned throughout the land.
And then, on a day of First Amendment infamy, April 17, 1990,
along came Smith. The facts surrounding Smith are quite familiar to
anyone who has even a passing interest in religious freedom law, so I
will highlight only briefly some aspects of the case that particularly
interest me.
The Smith case garnered relatively little attention on either of its
trips to the United States Supreme Court. Most of the public interest
organizations that normally take an active interest and file amicus
curiae briefs in church-state cases did not get involved.5 6 While this
may appear foolish with the advantage of hindsight, at the time there
seemed no reason to get very excited about the case. The facts dealt
with the question whether drug rehabilitation counselors who had
been fired from their jobs for using peyote in Native American relig-
56. Compare the short list of groups who filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the
free exercise claim in the 1990 version of Smith (American Jewish Congress,
Council on Religious Freedom, American Civil Liberties Union and its Oregon
affiliate, and a coalition of American Indian groups), with the long list of pro-
RFRA, pro-free exercise amicus filers seven years later in City ofBoerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997). LEXIS reveals a brief submitted by the Coalition for the
Free Exercise of Religion, representing over sixty organizations and with attor-
neys from twelve groups listed as counsel; another brief submitted on behalf of
the American Jewish Congress, American Federation of Teachers, American Jew-
ish Committee, Anti-Defamation League, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Af-
fairs, Central Conference of American Rabbis, National Education Association,
National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, People for the Ameri-
can Way, and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations; plus separate briefs
from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, National Right to Work
Legal Defense Foundation, the Knights of Columbus, the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, the American Bar Association, the Rutherford Institute,
the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, a coalition of thirteen state and local fam-
ily policy councils, Prison Fellowship Ministries together with the Aleph Insti-
tute, the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs, the American
Center for Law and Justice, and the National Committee for Amish Religious
Freedom-not to mention several supporting briefs by federal and state legisla-
tors, and one by a coalition of property rights groups.
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ious rituals could collect unemployment compensation because of the
religious motivation behind the conduct that led to their discharge-
not exactly the kind of dispute that is likely to impact millions of
Americans.
In addition, religious liberty advocates knew, except for one small
point, what the Supreme Court was going to do. Based on thirty years
of established legal precedent, the Court would apply the CSI/LRM
test to the Native Americans' claim that they should receive unem-
ployment because a firing based on religious conduct is not "for cause."
The only thing we did not know was which way the Court would come
down: it could find that the war on drugs was a compelling state in-
terest, justifying Oregon in denying the benefits of unemployment
compensation. 5 7 On the other hand, the Court might have found this
interest non-compelling, or (probably more likely) it might have ruled
that the interest was compelling but that exempting religious users of
peyote from the consequences of illegal drug use was a less restrictive
means of accomplishing that objective.58 Given the then-recent his-
tory of compelling interest determinations by the Supreme Court,5 9
there was reason to think that the government would win. One thing
was certain, however: nothing in the Smith case as it approached fi-
nal resolution suggested the likelihood of any significant change in
constitutional doctrine.
The Supreme Court, of course, had other ideas. To no one's great
surprise, the government won and the Native American practitioners
lost. To just about everyone's surprise, 60 in the process the Court jet-
tisoned the CSI/LRM test and came up with a new regime for evaluat-
ing free exercise claims, one that was much more deferential to
government interests. From now on, said the Court, the constitu-
tional test for free exercise of religion claims would be a "neutral law
of general applicability" rule: as long as the government's action did
not single out religion or religious believers for negative treatment,
but simply treated them the same as people who did not share the
religious beliefs in question, then the government would win the free
exercise case even if the government's interest was less than compel-
ling-the state interest, in fact, could be downright trivial-and even
57. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
891-907 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
58. Id. at 907-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
60. Oregon Attorney General Dave Frohnmayer, who argued the state's case before
the Supreme Court, was quoted as saying,
We had no clue that the Court would reconsider free exercise doctrine.
We thought we had won on the Sherbert v. Verner test. We thought that
if there were ever a compelling state interest, it would be one that you
could find in a state's uniform enforcement of its drug laws.
CAROLYN N. LONG, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND INDIAN RIGHTS 196-97 (2000).
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if the chosen legal means were unnecessarily restrictive of religious
conduct.61
One can debate, and scholars do now debate,62 the merits of the
"neutral law of general applicability" ("NLGA") approach as an ab-
stract question of constitutional law. What made Smith most shock-
ing, however, was its suddenness. Both parties to the case assumed
that it would be decided under standard CSI/LRM doctrine. Few
amici took any interest because of the same assumption. The new
NLGA approach gave every indication of being a radical departure
from established law. Although there are occasionally cases where the
government singles out a specific religion for adverse treatment,6 3
most of the free exercise of religion cases in our nation's history have
involved laws that applied to everyone, but only burdened the relig-
ious exercise of a minority.6 4 In all of these, under the new approach,
the government would simply win65 without having to prove that its
interest was compelling or its means narrowly tailored. This would
turn a test (CSI/LRM) very protective of religious freedom into one
under which the government would generally be expected to win. Re-
turning to our visual tool, it would look something like this:
Belief Human
Only NLGA CSI/LRM Sacrifice
I I I I
Some other interesting points about the Supreme Court's decision:
The Court not only abandoned the CSI/LRM test; it added insult to
injury by pretending that it had never existed as a general rule in
free exercise cases6 6 (to which the most appropriate response
would be: "Well, you sure fooled a whole nation full of judges, law-
yers, law professors, and authors of casebooks and horn books for
the last thirty years!"). Instead of overruling any or all of its prior
61. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 ("[Tlhe sounder approach . . . is to hold . . . [that] [tihe
government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harm-
ful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot de-
pend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's
spiritual development.'" (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988))).
62. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism,
58 U. CH. L. REV. 308 (1991); Michael McConnell, A Response to Professor Mar-
shall, 58 U. CHI. L, REV. 329 (1991); McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra
note 13.
63. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
64. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 22, 52-53 and 55.
65. Subject to possible exceptions described infra notes 76-83 and accompanying
text.
66. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85.
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free exercise rulings, the Court simply claimed that the new deci-
sion was consistent with precedent. How could it do that, you ask?
* The Court isolated Sherbert and Thomas, along with Hobbie v. Un-
employment Appeals Commission of Florida,67 as a sui generis
group of unemployment compensation cases 6 8-conveniently over-
looking the fact that Smith itself was an unemployment compensa-
tion case!
* The Court got around Cantwell and Yoder, along with several
other precedents, by characterizing them as "hybrid rights" cases
only won by the religious claimants because their free exercise ar-
gument was coupled with some other constitutional right such as
freedom of speech or the right of parents to control the upbringing
of their children. 6 9
* The Court characterized other free exercise cases such as Lee and
Gillette v. United States,70 in which it had clearly applied the CSI/
LRM test, but found it to be satisfied, as cases where the Justices
had only "purported to apply" strict scrutiny analysis.7 1 Had they
just been lying to us all along?
" The Court placed great weight on the factual exception cases of the
1980s (Bowen, Lyng, Goldman, and O'Lone), treating them as im-
plicit general rejections of the CSI/LRM test.7 2 Oddly, the Court
also seemed to rely on Minersville School District v. Gobitis73 -a
case that had been overruled only three years after it was
decided!74
* The Court drew on early free exercise cases such as Reynolds-
cases decided before the Court had developed a coherent free exer-
cise doctrine and before the modern administrative state made
government interference with religious practice a real possibility
for most Americans-as stating the doctrinal basis for free exercise
law, 75 while explaining away the most recent thirty years of cases.
What remains of the protections of the Free Exercise Clause after
Smith? Probably not very much, although perhaps a little bit more
than most commentators believed in the immediate aftermath of
Smith.76 First, on those rare occasions where the government directly
67. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
68. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
69. Id. at 881-82.
70. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
71. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
72. Id. at 883-84.
73. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943); see Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
74. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
75. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-80.
76. See Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith,
Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850
(2001).
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and overtly discriminates against some group of religious believers, it
will still be subject to strict scrutiny under the NLGA approach, and a
free exercise claim may be successful. 7 7
The "hybrid rights" exception to the NLGA rule might offer some
hope, but almost no one claims to understand what this means.7 8 If
the right to be combined with free exercise is itself a fundamental con-
stitutional right that triggers strict scrutiny, then what is to be gained
by adding in the free exercise claim at all? But if the second constitu-
tional right is one that does not trigger strict scrutiny on its own, and
neither does free exercise of religion, then is this a situation where
zero plus zero equals one?79 Hybrid rights analysis is made more com-
plicated by the fact that virtually any free exercise claim could also be
described as involving a second constitutional right.8 0 (Just for fun,
try to think of a free exercise claim that you could not describe as also
raising issues of free speech in communicating your religious views,
freedom of association with co-believers, or the right of parents to
raise their children in their religious tradition. It is pretty tough!) If
it were that easy to get back to CSI/LRM protection, the exception
would completely swallow the rule of Smith-an unlikely interpreta-
tion of the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence, to say the least.
There is also the possibility, at least suggested in Smith,8 1 that
CSJ/LRM may be triggered in a free exercise case when the govern-
ment action is not "neutral and generally applicable"-not just in the
sense of a law that specifically targets religion, but in the sense of a
law that applies generally to many people but contains exemptions for
certain groups. The exemptions, under this approach, make the law
not "generally applicable" and give religious believers the right to a
comparable exemption unless the government can prove a CSL/LRM.
Think of it as a "most favored nation" status for religion as compared
to other reasons for the government to exempt people from otherwise
77. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
78. See generally William J. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts:
Free Exercise Plus or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211
(1998); Gary Stuart McCaleb, Comment, A Century of Free Exercise Jurispru-
dence: Don't Practice What You Preach, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 253, 272-74 (1997);
Timothy J. Santoli, Note, A Decade After Employment Division v. Smith: Examin-
ing How Courts Are Still Grappling with the Hybrid-Rights Exception to the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 649 (2001).
79. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 566-67 (Souter, J., concurring); Duncan, supra note 76, at
857-59.
80. Duncan, supra note 76, at 857-59; Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith
and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 266 (1993).
81. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884
("T[Where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not
refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling
reason." (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986))).
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generally applicable laws.8 2 Here is how it could work: under Smith,
if a state uses its Twenty-first Amendment power to enact a total
statewide prohibition on possession of alcohol, with no exceptions at
all, then the Catholic believer who requires a small quantity of wine
for Mass is out of luck (unless a hybrid freedom of association claim
would work). It is a neutral law of general applicability, so the gov-
ernment wins. However, what if the state, for whatever political rea-
son, includes an exception to the law-say, allowing restaurants to
serve wine with meals, or baseball parks to serve beer at games? Now
the law has exceptions, and an argument can be made that it is no
longer a neutral law of general applicability so the CSI/LRM test
would apply to the free exercise claim to receive Communion wine.
In addition, there are government actions that involve individual
assessments of various circumstances. Land use law, which typically
involves a system of special exceptions and conditional use permits
that are granted or not granted for various (often political or financial)
reasons, is a prime example. Smith suggests that these may also be
situations in which the religious claimant is entitled to the protection
of strict scrutiny.8 3
Finally, there are, of course, state law protections for religious free-
dom. Some state supreme courts have interpreted their state consti-
tutions as requiring pre-Smith-style CSI/LRM protection for free
exercise claims,8 4 and similar protection has been enacted legisla-
tively through state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts in twelve
states.8 5 The state law issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
82. Duncan, supra note 76, at 860-63.
83. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
84. See State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 241 (Wis. 1996); Swanner v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 280-82 (Alaska 1994); Attorney General v.
Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 236 (Mass. 1994); Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 850 n.4
(Vt. 1994); People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 134 n.27 (Mich. 1993); State v.
Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398-99 (Minn. 1990); First Covenant Church of
Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 185-88 (Wash. 1992); see also Daniel A.
Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State Courts,
10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235 (1998).
85. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03 (West 2004); see also S.B. 1391, 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 1999); S.B. 370, 90th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1999); H.B. 601, 76th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999); H.B. 2370, 90th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1998);
H.B. 1041, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Md. 1998); S.B. 321, 208th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J.
1998). Cf. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (West Supp. 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 42-80.1-2 to 42-80.1-3 (1998) (not defining "exercise of religion" in statute);
S.B. 604, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998) (amending the 1901 Constitution of
Alabama pending approval by the voters). Four proposed state RFRA statutes
define exercise of religion by referring to the clause in the state constitution. See
H.B. 3158, 113th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1999); S.B. 222d Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 1999); H.B. 4376, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997); S.B. 105, 181st
Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997).
2006]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
All things considered, when religious liberty advocates considered
the state of the law after Smith was decided, it did not look very en-
couraging. It was time to take action, and legislation looked like the
path to victory. It was time for the Lobbying Nineties to begin.
IV. THE LOBBYING NINETIESs6
The Smith decision produced a firestorm of criticism with few
precedents in First Amendment advocacy. Few legal scholars or advo-
cates had invested much energy as the case worked its way to the Su-
preme Court,8 7 but release of the Court's opinion was a catalyst for
immediate action.
The first line of attack was a petition for rehearing,8 8 asking the
Court to put Smith back on the docket for another round of briefing
and oral argument. A veritable "Who's Who" of law professors and
church-state attorneys participated in writing the petition and in-
cluded their names as authors8 9 or as counsel for the various organi-
86. I think that it may be appropriate to note for interested readers (including the
members of the Promotion and Tenure Committee at Regent University School of
Law) that because much of this Part is based on my own memories of meetings
and activities in which I took part during the Lobbying Nineties, see infra notes
95, 128 and 148, I will not be able to document everything in typical scholarly
fashion. I have used Carolyn N. Long's excellent and well-researched book,
LONG, supra note 60, to fill in a few gaps in my recollection of the details. I
strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in exploring the story of the
Smith case and RFRA in more detail.
87. See supra note 56.
88. Petition for Rehearing, Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith,
496 U.S. 913 (1990) (No. 88-1213) [hereinafter Petition for Rehearing]. The re-
hearing was denied.
89. Gerald Gunther, Douglas Laycook, Kent Greenawalt, Michael W. McConnell,
Norman Redlich, Laurence H. Tribe, Sanford Levinson, Craig J. Dorsay, Amy
Adelson, Marc D. Stern, Lois C. Waldman, Leo Pfeffer, Frank S. Alexander, John
S. Baker, Jr., Charles W. Barrow, William W. Bassett, Patrick L. Baude, Harold
J. Berman, Ivan Bodensteiner, Howard Bromberg, Lynn Robert Buzzard, Angela
C. Carmella, Erwin Chemerinsky, Daniel D. Conckle, David M. Cobin, Joseph L.
Daly, George W. Dent, Jr., C. Thomas Dienes, Robert A. Destro, Robert F.
Drinan, W. Cole Durham, Jr., Carl H. Esbeck, Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.,
Marc Gallanter, John K. Garvey, Frederick Mark Gedicks, Donald Gjerdingen,
David W. Gwinn, Lynne Henderson, Allan Ides, Stanley Ingber, Phillip E. John-
son, Edward J. Larson, Rosalie Levinson, Karl Manheim, John H. Mansfield,
Christopher N. May, Judith A. McMorrow, James M. O'Fallon, Stephen L. Pep-
per, Michael John Perry, Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Charles E. Rice, Lauren Robel,
Michael Scherschligt, Margaret Gay Stewart, III, Richard Stith, Ruti G. Teitel,
Howard Vogel, Steven Shapiro, Alan Reeve Hunt, Sam Rabinove, Lee Boothby,
Oliver S. Thomas, Michael Woodruff, Samuel E. Ericsson, David J. Hardy,
Mitchell Tyner, Philip Draheim, Forest D. Montgomery, Bradley P. Jacob (well,
okay, not all of them were renowned), Douglas Laycock, Arden E. Shenker, Elliot
M. Mincberg, Carolyn Shain, John Whitehead, William B. Duffy, Ralph Helge,
and William Bentley Ball. See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 88.
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zations 9o that joined the brief. The list was particularly notable for its
breadth across the political spectrum, and its inclusion as co-advo-
cates of individuals and groups that commonly worked on opposite
sides in other cases, particularly in the Establishment Clause realm.
This broad spectrum of advocacy to change the result of Smith would
hold, with a few notable exceptions, for most of the decade, and it be-
came one of the most distinctive dynamics of the free exercise battles.
The petition for rehearing was not long, and its main point was
fairly straightforward: no one had expected the Court to use Smith as
a vehicle to reconsider the CSI/LRM test. Neither of the parties had
briefed or argued, either affirmatively or negatively, the question of
whether strict scrutiny should be jettisoned as the appropriate consti-
tutional test for free exercise cases, 9 1 nor had any amicus weighed in
on that question. 92 The Court's decision had taken everyone by sur-
prise-not in its result, which most felt could have gone either way,
but in the dramatic decision to change the methodology for deciding
free exercise cases. The petition simply asked the Court to reconsider
its decision in Smith by bringing the case back for further briefing and
oral argument so that both sides of the question of jettisoning the es-
tablished strict scrutiny approach could be adequately presented to
the Court for consideration. 9 3
Upon receipt of the petition for rehearing, the Supreme Court did
what it virtually always does when asked to consider the possibility
that a recently-decided case was wrong: it denied the motion before
giving it time to collect any dust on the Court clerk's desk.94 Denial of
the petition meant that there was little hope of effecting any judicial
changes in the law established by Smith, at least until the next time
an appropriate free exercise case arose to permit the issue to be
briefed and argued before the Court. The battlefield shifted to Con-
gress; the war for RFRA began. 95
90. American Jewish Congress, ACLU Foundation, American Friends Service Com-
mittee, American Jewish Committee, Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Baptist Joint Committee, CLS, Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America, General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, Lutheran Church-Mis-
souri Synod, National Association of Evangelicals, Williamsburg Charter Foun-
dation, National Council of Churches, National Jewish Community Relations
Advisory Council, People for the American Way, General Assembly of the Presby-
terian Church (USA), Rutherford Institute, Unitarian Universalist Association,
and the Worldwide Church of God. See id.
91. Id. at 5-7.
92. Id. at 7.
93. Id. at 11-12, 15.
94. The petition was filed on May 10, 1990, less than a month after Smith was de-
cided, and denied by the Court less than a month later on June 4. Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 913 (1990).
95. Background disclosure: In 1990, when Smith was decided, I was Director of Mem-
bership Ministries and General Counsel of the CLS, a not-for-profit ministry of
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One of the truly amazing aspects of the Lobbying Nineties was the
political and ideological breadth of the coalition that came together in
opposition to the Smith decision. In church-state law, then as now,
there are a number of issues and perspectives that divide advocates in
different directions: liberal versus conservative; Christian versus
Jewish versus other faiths; supporters of traditional religious prac-
tices versus those focused on new or unusual religions. These differ-
ences tend to be particularly apparent in debates involving the
meaning of the Establishment Clause.96
On free exercise issues, however, there has tended to be a higher
level of unity. Groups who are more open to public religiosity, and
groups that tend to strongly oppose religion in the public square, gen-
erally come together on the question of individual religious practice.
Almost everyone in the world of religious liberty advocacy supports
expansive free exercise rights. For this reason, there has generally
been a fairly high level of collegiality among these advocates. When I
was working at CLS, we were always careful to be respectful and cour-
teous even when disagreeing with, for example, the American Jewish
Congress ("AJC") or Americans United for Separation of Church and
State ("AUSCS") on an Establishment Clause issue, because we knew
that the next case might well be a free exercise case on which we
would file a joint brief with those groups. The working relationships
were and are enormously important.
The Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion ("CFER"), which
grew up in 1990-91 to oppose Smith and seek legislative protection for
free exercise of religion, reflected broad support from across the ideo-
logical spectrum. The groups playing organizational and leadership
roles in the CFER ranged from CLS, the National Association of
Evangelicals ("NAE"), and Home School Legal Defense Association
("HSLDA"), on the one hand, to AJC, AUSCS, the Baptist Joint Com-
mittee on Public Affairs, and the American Civil Liberties Union
Christian attorneys that played a lead role in advocating for RFRA. From 1991
through 1993, through most of the lobbying for RFRA, I was Executive Director
and CEO of CLS. (To be completely honest, the bulk of the actual Capitol Hill
lobbying work was done by my friend and colleague, Steven T. McFarland, then
Director of CLS's Center for Law and Religious Freedom.) My departure from
CLS staff coincided almost exactly, although not purposefully, with the final pas-
sage of RFRA.
96. For example, consider the players in current debates over school vouchers or
President Bush's proposals for government support for faith-based service provid-
ers. See, e.g., John C. Eastman, The Magic of Vouchers Is No Sleight of Hand: A
Reply to Steven K. Green, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 195 (2003); Jody Freeman, Ex-
tending Public Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1285 (2003);
Steven K. Green, The Illusionary Aspect of "Private Choice" for Constitutional
Analysis, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 549 (2002); David Saperstein, Public Accounta-




("ACLU"), on the other. Groups and individuals playing a lesser sup-
porting role in CFER's mission were similarly diverse. 9 7 Mike Farris
of HSLDA, a staunch conservative, and Marc Stern of AJC, a staunch
liberal, worked together in key positions on the initial drafting com-
mittee for RFRA. As noted above, most of the nation's foremost consti-
tutional law professors allied themselves with the battle.
The CFER worked quickly to prepare a legislative response to
Smith, and by July of 1990, the RFRA was introduced in Congress. As
within the CFER, Congressional support was widespread and diverse:
initial sponsors included Rep. Steven Solarz (D-NY), Rep. Don Ed-
wards (D-CA), Rep. James Sensenbrenner (R-WI), Rep. Paul Henry
(R-MI),98 Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE), and Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT).
Although the drafting and negotiating process of give-and-take
sometimes made it seem quite complicated, RFRA was in essence
quite simple: it fixed Smith. RFRA created a federal statutory right to
free exercise of religion that could only be defeated by proof that any
substantial burden on religious exercise was the least restrictive
means of accomplishing a compelling governmental interest. It moved
97. As of March 1993, the following groups-as diverse a collection as one often sees
in D.C. politics-were listed on the CFER's letterhead: Agudath Israel of
America, ACLU, American Conference on Religious Movements, American Hu-
manist Association, American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress,
American Muslim Council, Americans for Religious Liberty, Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, Anti-Defamation League, Association of
Christian Schools International, Association on American Indian Affairs, Baptist
Joint Committee on Public Affairs, B'nai B'rith, Central Conference of American
Rabbis, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), CLS, Christian Life Commission
of the Southern Baptist Convention, Christian Science Committee on Publication,
Church of the Brethren, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Church of
Scientology International, Coalitions for America, Concerned Women for
America, Council of Jewish Federations, Council on Religious Freedom, Episcopal
Church, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Federation of Reconstruction-
ist Congregations and Havurot, First Liberty Institute, Friends Committee on
National Legislation, General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, Guru
Gobind Singh Foundation, Hadassah, Home School Legal Defense Association,
House of Bishops of the Episcopal Church, International Institute for Religious
Freedom, Mennonite Central Committee U.S., NA'AMAT USA, National Associa-
tion of Evangelicals, National Council of Churches, National Council of Jewish
Women, National Drug Strategy Network, National Federation of Temple Sister-
hoods, National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs, National Jewish
Community Relations Advisory Council, National Sikh Center, Native American
Church of North America, People for the American Way Action Fund, Presbyte-
rian Church (USA) Social Justice and Peacemaking Unit, Rabbinical Council of
America, Traditional Values Coalition, Union of American Hebrew Congrega-
tions, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, Unitarian Universal-
ist Association of Congregations, United Church of Christ Office for Church in
Society, and United Methodist Church Board of Church & Society. Memorandum
from Oliver Thomas to RFRA Coalition (Mar. 2, 1993) (on file with the NEBRASKA
LAW REVIEW).
98. The late son of the late, great evangelical theologian Dr. Carl F.H. Henry.
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the protection of the Free Exercise Clause back to the high levels en-
joyed pre-Smith.
Belief Human
Only Employment Div. v. Smith RFRA Sacrifice
I I I I
RFRA was able to accomplish this feat-a legislative "fix" of a Su-
preme Court ruling that reduced individual freedom under the Free
Exercise Clause-because Congress's power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment 9 9 to enforce the provisions of that Amend-
ment gave Congress authority to create statutory protections for fun-
damental freedoms that were more expansive than the constitutional
rights as determined by the Supreme Court-or so, at least, many
leading scholars believed at the time. The Court's latest pronounce-
ment on the Section 5 power, Katzenbach v. Morgan,OO had upheld
the constitutionality of a provision of the federal Voting Rights Act
which outlawed New York's English-language requirement for voting
even though the same voting requirement had earlier been found by
the Court not to violate the Constitution. Thus, Congress had the
power under Section 5 to create a substantive statutory right that was
broader in scope than the constitutional right. According to the Court,
there was a three-part test to determine whether a federal statute is
"appropriate legislation" under Section 5:
* whether the statute may be regarded as an enactment to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause (or, presumably, the Due Process
Clause, since the Section 5 power by its terms applies equally to
both);
* whether it is "plainly adapted to that end"; and
* whether it is not prohibited by but is consistent with "the letter
and spirit of the constitution."1O1
This was sometimes referred to as the "one-way ratchet" approach to
Section 5. As Justice Brennan made clear in footnote ten to his major-
ity opinion, Congress's power under Section 5 was to increase legal
99. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The primary provisions to be
enforced are found in Section 1 of the same Amendment: "No state shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Because the right to free exercise of religion is a funda-
mental right substantively incorporated into due process of law, see supra note 19
and accompanying text, Section 5 gives Congress the power to enforce that right
against the states.
100. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
101. Id. at 651.
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protections for individual rights, but never to decrease those protec-
tions below constitutional minimums:102
[Section] 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion in the other
direction and to enact "statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and
due process decisions of this Court." We emphasize that Congress' power
under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the
Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute
these guarantees. Thus, for example, an enactment authorizing the States to
establish racially segregated systems of education would not be-as required
by § 5-a measure "to enforce" the Equal Protection Clause since that clause
of its own force prohibits such state laws.
1 0 3
Thus, the CFER leadership believed that as in Katzenbach, RFRA was
a constitutional use of Congress's power to use legislation to expand a
fundamental personal right under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Leading constitutional scholars, including Dean Edward Gaff-
ney of Valparaiso University School of Law and Professors Michael
McConnell of the University of Chicago Law School and Douglas Lay-
cock of the University of Texas School of Law, argued their support for
this conclusion and advocated the enactment of RFRA through letters,
memoranda, and articles in both scholarly and popular
publications. 104
When RFRA was introduced, the prospects for its passage looked
very bright. There was very little substantive opposition to the draft
legislation, and for a Congress that is usually bombarded by conflict-
ing expert and popular opinion on every issue, a bill supported by vir-
tually everyone with an interest in the subject matter takes on the
appearance of a slam-dunk. Before RFRA was able to sail through
Congress, however, the abortion issue reared its ugly head.
To understand the significance of abortion in the RFRA debate in
1990-92, the reader needs to remember that during that time, the Su-
preme Court's most recent pronouncement on abortion was found in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,105 which had upheld several
abortion restrictions in Missouri law. The plurality opinion in Webster
used language that signaled to most Court-watchers that the personal
right to abortion found in Roe v. Wade106 was about to go away. 10 7
102. There could, of course, be cases where it is not so clear whether a statute is in-
creasing or decreasing personal liberty. For example, would a state law forbid-
ding affirmative action in higher education admissions best be characterized as
decreasing the freedom of members of minority groups, or as increasing the free-
dom of all people to be selected based on personal merit? Many would disagree.
103. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
104. For an example of a jointly-authored piece, see Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Doug-
las Laycock & Michael W. McConnell, An Answer to Smith- The Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act, CHRISTIAN LEGAL Soc'y Q., Winter 1990, at 17.
105. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
106. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
107. For example:
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Both the pro-life and abortion rights camps believed that the Supreme
Court's eventual overruling of Roe was just a matter of time.1 0 8
Because of this optimistic (or pessimistic, depending on your point
of view) picture of the future of the constitutional right to abortion on
demand, pro-life groups in the first years of the 1990s were extremely
We think that the doubt cast upon the Missouri statute by these
cases is not so much a flaw in the statute as it is a reflection of the fact
that the rigid trimester analysis of the course of a pregnancy enunciated
in Roe has resulted in subsequent cases.. . making constitutional law in
this area a virtual Procrustean bed. Statutes specifying elements of in-
formed consent to be provided abortion patients, for example, were inval-
idated if they were thought to "structur[e] ... the dialogue between the
woman and her physician." . . . [S]uch a statute would have been sus-
tained under any traditional standard of judicial review, or for any other
surgical procedure except abortion.
Stare decisis is a cornerstone of our legal system, but it has less
power in constitutional cases, where, save for constitutional amend-
ments, this Court is the only body able to make needed changes. We
have not refrained from reconsideration of a prior construction of the
Constitution that has proved "unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice." We think the Roe trimester framework falls into that
category.
In the first place, the rigid Roe framework is hardly consistent with
the notion of a Constitution cast in general terms, as ours is, and usually
speaking in general principles, as ours does. The key elements of the
Roe framework-trimesters and viability-are not found in the text of
the Constitution or in any place else one would expect to find a constitu-
tional principle. Since the bounds of the inquiry are essentially indeter-
minate, the result has been a web of legal rules that have become
increasingly intricate, resembling a code of regulations rather than a
body of constitutional doctrine. As JUSTICE WHITE has put it, the trimes-
ter framework has left this Court to serve as the country's "ex officio
medical board with powers to approve or disapprove medical and opera-
tive practices and standards throughout the United States."
In the second place, we do not see why the State's interest in protect-
ing potential human life should come into existence only at the point of
viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state
regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability. . . . "[T]he
State's interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before
viability."
Both appellants and the United States as amicus curiae have urged
that we overrule our decision in Roe v. Wade. The facts of the present
case, however, differ from those at issue in Roe. Here, Missouri has de-
termined that viability is the point at which its interest in potential
human life must be safeguarded. In Roe, on the other hand, the Texas
statute criminalized the performance of all abortions, except when the
mother's life was at stake. This case therefore affords us no occasion to
revisit the holding of Roe, which was that the Texas statute unconstitu-
tionally infringed the right to an abortion derived from the Due Process
Clause, and we leave it undisturbed. To the extent indicated in our opin-
ion, we would modify and narrow Roe and succeeding cases.
Webster, 492 U.S. at 517-19, 521 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
108. See, e.g., David Mills, Abortion: The Issue of the '90's, Says Pro-Lifer, WASH.
TIMES, July 18, 1989, at El ("'We think that the court is very close to overturning
Roe,' Miss Smith says. 'Very, very close. It's just a matter of time.'").
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wary of other legal avenues that might be used to permit abortions in
a post-Roe world. Some pro-life advocates who had been initially in-
clined to support RFRA now began to give the bill a hard look. What
if, after the end of the right to abortion, abortion rights advocates
seized on the strategy of claiming that their religion compelled them
to have abortions (or perhaps that their religion compelled them to be
free to make the decisions as to whether to have abortions)? Was it
possible that enactment of RFRA could make it more likely that these
claims could succeed in court-that RFRA's passage might increase
the numbers of babies lost to abortion? No one underestimated the
creativity and tenacity of abortion rights advocates.
Based on this analysis, early in 1991, the National Right to Life
Committee ("NRLC") came out in opposition to RFRA.109 Even more
damaging to the CFER's efforts, the United States Catholic Confer-
ence followed suit a couple of months later.11o Within the community
of religious liberty advocates, support for RFRA was still very high,
and even within the community of organizations committed to the
right to life, reactions to RFRA were split;"' but the division over
abortion was enough to end the perception in Congress that RFRA
was a bill that could be supported without any political downside. In
particular, the opposition of the Catholic Conference made RFRA
problematic for several key Catholic members of Congress, most nota-
bly influential Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL). The next two years would see
ongoing frustrations for the CFER as the once apparently unstoppable
freight train of RFRA slowed to a crawl and failed to escape from the
congressional roundhouse.
Light appeared at the end of RFRA's tunnel when the Supreme
Court decided Planned Parenthood v. Caseyl1 2 on June 29, 1992. In-
stead of overruling Roe v. Wade, as both pro-life and abortion rights
advocates had believed likely between 1989 and 1992, the Court reaf-
firmed the "essential holding" of Roe: that women have a constitu-
tional right to abort their unborn children.113 Casey was a
devastating defeat for the pro-life movement, but it did have one unin-
tended positive side-effect on RFRA: since the Court signaled in no
uncertain terms that the constitutional right to abortion was not going
to go away any time in the near future, there was no reason to be
particularly concerned about pro-abortion advocates using other legal
109. DAVID M. ACKERMAN, THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT: ITS RISE, FALL,
AND CURRENT STATUS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 97-795 A, at 3 n.10 (1998),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/judiciary/97-795.pdf.
110. See generally LONG, supra note 60, ch. 11.
111. For example, CLS and NAE remained in leadership positions in the CFER.
Other pro-life groups such as Americans United for Life and the Christian Action
Council joined the opposition.
112. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
113. Id. at 846.
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vehicles-such as RFRA-to promote abortion rights. I took part in a
meeting on August 7, 1992, with other pro-life, pro-RFRA leaders at
the offices of the Catholic Conference. At length we dissected Casey
and the current state of abortion law, trying to evaluate how much
pro-life downside remained associated with RFRA, and how to balance
that risk against the bill's powerful benefits in protecting religious
freedom. Not long later, the Catholic Conference came out in favor of
RFRA, and the major political impediment to its passage was
removed.
RFRA was passed by a unanimous voice vote in the House of Rep-
resentatives on May 11, 1993,114 and passed in an amended version
by the Senate on October 27, 1993, by a vote of ninety-seven to
three.115 The House accepted the Senate amendment, again by unan-
imous voice vote, on November 3, 1993,116 and President Clinton
signed RFRA into law on November 16, 1993.117 For the next four
years, calm and tranquility descended over the world of religious lib-
erty law. Good results came out of the lower courts as they applied
RFRA,118 and it seemed that perhaps the legislative battles over free
exercise of religion had come to an end.
Peace reigned under RFRA until the Supreme Court entered the
fray once again. On June 25, 1997, the Court ruled in City of Boerne v.
Flores 119 that RFRA was unconstitutional, at least as applied to ac-
114. H.R. 1308, 103d Cong. (1993). For voting information, see The Library of Con-
gress, Bill Summary & Status for the 103rd Congress, H.R. 1308 (1993), http:l!
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d103:HR01308:&&&L&summ2=m&-TOM:/
bss/dl03query.html [hereinafter H.R. 1308 Summary & Status].
115. The Senate amendment limited RFRA's application somewhat; instead of apply-
ing whenever the government "burdens" a person's religious exercise, the
amended version applies when the government "substantially burdens" a per-
son's religious exercise. S. 578, 103d Cong. (1993) (record vote number 331 as
passed by Senate, October 27, 1993). For voting information, see U.S. Senate
Roll Call Votes 103rd Congress-lst Session Vote Summary, http://www.senate.
gov/legislative/LIS/roll call lists/roll call vote cfm.cfn?congress=103&session=1
&vote=00331 (last visited Feb. 14, 2006); see also H.R. 1308 Summary & Status,
supra note 114. The CFER was not pleased with the amendment, but it was
politically necessary in order to secure RFRA's passage in the Senate.
116. See H.R. 1308 Summary & Status, supra note 114.
117. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488; see also H.R. 1308 Summary & Status, supra note 114.
118. See, e.g., Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d
1407, 1420 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that under RFRA, a bankruptcy trustee may
not recover contributions made to a church); Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018,
1022 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that RFRA is constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and was violated by application of prison regulation banning all re-
ligious jewelry); Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1364 (5th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that RFRA is constitutional), rev'd, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
119. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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tions of state and local government entities. 120 The Court rejected the
"one-way ratchet" interpretation of Katzenbach,12 1 holding instead
that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment only permits Congress to
enact remedial legislation that is "congruen[t] and proportiona[]"1 2 2
to actual identified violations of the Constitution, as the Court cur-
rently interprets the Constitution. Remedial legislation to prevent
constitutional violations, said the Court, must be based on solid legis-
lative findings of unconstitutional conduct by state and local govern-
ments, and must be narrowly tailored to correct those violations.123
Because RFRA attempted to ratchet protection for religious freedom
up from the limited Smith standard to the higher protection of pre-
Smith law, the Court found that the statute was not a constitutional
use of the Section 5 power. The clock rolled back to 1990 on these
state free exercise claims, and once again religious believers had the
benefit of only the NLGA approach, and not the more protective CSI/
LRM standard. As noted above,12 4 since the Court's holding of uncon-
stitutionality seemed to rest on Congress's inability under Section 5 of
120. There is some uncertainty as to the status of RFRA as legislation applying strict
scrutiny to free exercise claims against the federal government. In Boerne, the
Court never explicitly limited its holding of unconstitutionality to state law appli-
cations of RFRA. However, the Court's reasoning focused on the lack of Congres-
sional power to enact RFRA under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at
519-36, a rationale that would not seem to affect federal applications of the stat-
ute. Justice Stevens stood alone in his conviction, which would have invalidated
the statute entirely, that RFRA constitutes an unconstitutional establishment of
religion. Id. at 536-37 (Stevens, J., concurring). Most lower courts, e.g., Guam v.
Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2002); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th
Cir. 2001); Young, 141 F.3d 854; In re Hodge, 220 B.R. 386 (D. Idaho 1998), and
commentators, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of Religious Free-
dom Legislation, 20 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 715 (1998); Jesse H. Choper, On
the Difference in Importance Between Supreme Court Doctrine and Actual Conse-
quences: A Review of the Supreme Court's 1996-1997 Term, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
2259, 2303 & n.289 (1998), who have considered the question have expressed the
view that RFRA is still good law as applied to the federal government, and Con-
gress expressed its agreement with that view by amending RFRA in RLUIPA to
eliminate references to state law, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3, amended by Pub. L. No.
106-274, § 7b, 114 Stat. 803, 806 (2000). However, a minority of courts, e.g.,
United States v. Sandia, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D.N.M. 1997), and scholars, e.g.,
Lino A. Graglia, City of Boerne v. Flores: An Essay on the Invalidation of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 68 Miss. L.J. 675, 675 (1998), have taken the
opposite position. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005), the Supreme
Court stated that the Boerne decision "invalidated RFRA as applied to States and
their subdivisions, holding that the Act exceeded Congress' remedial powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment." Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2118. The Court noted
in a footnote that federal courts of appeals have upheld post-Boerne federal appli-
cations of RFRA, but qualified that apparent conclusion with the comment: 'This
Court, however, has not had occasion to rule on the matter." Id. at 2118 n.2.
121. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
122. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
123. Id. at 525-27, 532-34.
124. See supra note 120.
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the Fourteenth Amendment to protect religious freedom vis-a-vis the
states, RFRA is generally believed to remain as an effective statute
modifying federal law.
It was time for the CFER to gear up for lobbying action once again.
The first thought was to pursue a constitutional amendment. Since
the Supreme Court, through Smith and Boerne, had demonstrated lit-
tle patience with efforts to restore CSI/LRM protection to religious
freedom, maybe it was time for an effort to take the matter out of the
Justices' hands. A constitutional amendment becomes the law of the
land and must be implemented by the Court whether the Justices like
it or not. However, a strong majority of the CFER leadership group
believed that an amendment was politically impossible because of the
requirements of supermajorities in both houses of Congress and the
state legislatures for ratification.125 There was not even consensus
within the CFER that a constitutional amendment was desirable.
The CFER turned its attention to a new statutory remedy. Since
the Supreme Court had found RFRA to be too wide and sweeping a
remedy for free exercises cases, the decision was made to draft a new
bill that would base congressional authority on three constitutional
sources: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (narrowly tailored to
specific areas of religious discrimination with appropriate factual find-
ings to survive scrutiny under the Boerne standard); the spending
power;126 and the interstate commerce power.127
It was at this point that the broad unity of the CFER first began to
come apart. The first cadre to split away in 1998 was a small, but
politically formidable, group of very conservative Christian organiza-
tions led by Michael P. Farris, President of HSLDA.128 Farris had
been one of the leaders of the CFER from the beginning, but RLPA's
use of the Commerce Clause to protect religious freedom caused him
to move from leadership of the effort to leadership of the opposition.
With him went Christian groups including Concerned Women for
America, the American Family Association, Eagle Forum, and the
Traditional Values Coalition. Most of the rest of the Christian advo-
125. See infra section V.A.
126. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Wel-
fare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
127. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the sev-
eral States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
128. Background disclosure: From 1998 to 2000, during the battles over RLPA and
RLUIPA, I was employed by HSLDA, a key group opposing RLPA on federalism
grounds. My primary job at HSLDA was to work on the start-up of a new college,
now Patrick Henry College in Purcellville, Virginia, which I served as Provost
and Dean. However, I was also asked to invest some time and energy in the
RLPA debate during 1998-99, including my only opportunity to date to testify
before a congressional committee.
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cacy groups, including some very influential organizations that had
played little or no part in the fight for RFRA in 1990-93 (such as
Charles Colson's Prison Fellowship and Dr. James Dobson's Focus on
the Family), were now active supporters of the Coalition. The inter-
esting dynamic about this split was that all parties were in substan-
tive agreement on the evils of Smith and the need to take action to
protect religious freedom for all Americans. The division was entirely
over means, not ends.
At its heart, the disagreement revolved around this question: Was
it the weak state of post-Smith free exercise protection, on the one
hand, or the expansive power of the federal government which, since
the 1930s, had played an increasingly broad role in the lives of private
citizens, on the other hand, that presented the greater danger to the
freedoms of Christians and other Americans in 1998? For conserva-
tives with federalist leanings, this was truly a dilemma. Although
everyone wanted to protect free exercise, Farris and others believed
that the greater threat to liberty was found in federal government ex-
pansion over the past sixty years, with the interstate Commerce
Clause as the primary tool for turning a national government of lim-
ited, enumerated powers 12 9 into a nanny state that regulates almost
every aspect of life. Federalism and a return to limited national pow-
ers were seen as crucial. In recent years, the Supreme Court had
given signs of some openness to parameters around the previously-
limitless commerce power,130 and Farris's group wanted Congress to
take the lead in developing those parameters, rather than using the
commerce power in new, creative ways such as protecting religious
liberty. There was also an integrity element to their position: since
religious conservatives harshly criticize every effort by political liber-
als to expand federal power using the Commerce Clause, how can
those same religious conservatives seize the Commerce Clause as a
tool when their own issue, religious freedom, is at stake?
These arguments, of course made no sense at all to the liberal
members of the CFER, who for the most part are advocates of expan-
sive federal power and are not even slightly troubled by use of the
Commerce Clause. They did not even play very well with the con-
servative groups who remained part of the Coalition, led by Prison
Fellowship's Colson. When Farris would say, "RLPA treats religion as
commerce," Colson would respond, "The commerce provision of RLPA,
by its terms, only applies when religious freedom is violated in a com-
mercial setting. If there's no commerce, the Act simply doesn't ap-
129. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 33 (1824).




ply."13 1 Both were right, in a sense. One of Farris's major concerns
was that individual religious believers, churches, ministries, and
Christian schools, in an effort to secure RLPA's positive benefits for
themselves, would litigate cases establishing that their activities had
sufficient impact on interstate commerce to bring them under the Act.
After the believers won these cases, Congress might in future years
act to regulate these same individuals, churches, ministries, and
schools in more oppressive ways, using the precedents won by the be-
lievers to establish Commerce Clause authority.
Unfortunately, the rhetoric of this dispute became unpleasant at
times. Both sides believed in the justice of their cause and passion-
ately wanted to win. In addition, both Colson and Farris are influen-
tial, dynamic leaders within the Christian community, and neither
likes to lose. Sometimes the heat of passionate disagreement over-
whelmed the light of reasonable discussion, and many took notice.
Conservative Christians who were used to hearing unified voices from
their leaders on public policy issues did not know whom to believe.
World magazine, a leading weekly Christian-perspective news maga-
zine, caught the spirit with a June 1998 cover story. 1 3 2 The cover,
headlined "Strained Relations," featured a full-color caricature of
Chuck Colson and Mike Farris arm-wrestling. Colson and Farris both
responded with lengthy letters to the editor in the next two issues. 13 3
It was a battle. The pro-RLPA side, led by Rep. Charles Canady of
Florida, himself a Christian, had large and influential groups includ-
ing not only Prison Fellowship and Focus on the Family with their
millions of followers, but also advocacy organizations such as CLS,
131. The attitude that the limits of commerce power were not a relevant concern
seemed to be common on Capitol Hill as well. I testified against RLPA as a last-
minute replacement for Farris before the Constitution Subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee on May 12, 1999. In response to my comments that
Congress should exercise restraint and not accept a broad understanding of its
commerce powers, Representative Jerrold Nadler replied:
But [Mr. Jacob], as I understand that argument, the argument is we
shouldn't pass this because it is extending the Commerce Clause into
local affairs, extending congressional powers into local affairs ..., but
the fact is we are not extending anything. The courts will tell us exactly
what our authority is and whatever it is, it is, and that is how far it will
go.
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1691 Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 323
(1999) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Member, House Comm. on the Judici-
ary). Not only among political scientists, law professors, and advocates, but also
within Congress itself, it is very hard to get past the idea that Congress should
just take action on any issue that interests it and wait for the Supreme Court to
tell it that it has stepped over its boundaries.
132. Bob Jones IV, Strongarming, WORLD, June 20, 1998, at 14.
133. Charles W. Colson, Colson Responds, WORLD, June 27, 1998, at 4; Michael P.
Farris, Farris Responds, Too, WORLD, July 4/11, 1998, at 4.
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NAE, and the Southern Baptist Convention Christian Life Commis-
sion that had been centrally involved since the early days of RFRA.
The Farris-led group was much smaller in numbers but, perhaps be-
cause it included some of the most politically and socially conservative
groups, it was equally determined and more effective politically than
one might expect. The homeschool community, in particular, had
proven itself over the years extremely responsive to the leadership of
Farris and HSLDA, and willing to flood policy makers with letters,
phone calls, and e-mails in numbers that would be unbelievable for
any other group its size.13 4
Round I went to Farris.13 5 In a last-minute effort to keep RLPA
alive in 1998, Canady cut a deal with Farris: call off your active oppo-
sition to RLPA, and the commerce power comes out of the bill. Farris
agreed. Many leaders of the CFER were furious at what they saw,
correctly, as a material weakening of the bill, but Canady was almost
certainly right if the goal was to pass RLPA in 1998. RLPA was not
going to pass both the House and the Senate with the Farris-led coali-
tion in active opposition, so removing the commerce provision offered
134. When Congress was considering legislation in 1994 that might have had the ef-
fect of requiring homeschool teacher-parents to be state certified in education-
the so-called Miller Amendment to House Bill 6-Farris and HSLDA rallied the
homeschool community nationwide to flood Capitol Hill with negative feedback.
For several days, the Congressional switchboard was shut down under the tidal
wave of phone calls. Senators and Representatives could not even reach their
own staffs by telephone. When it came time for a vote in the House on an amend-
ment to exempt homeschoolers from the certification requirement, it passed by
an overwhelming 374-53. HSLDA, The Battle of H.R. 6, http://www.hslda.org/
about/history/battlehr6.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2006). The message seemed
clear: Don't mess with the homeschoolers!
135. In addition to the conservative coalition led by Farris, which agreed with the sub-
stantive goals of RLPA but disagreed over means, there were a few groups on the
political left who opposed RLPA on substantive grounds. It seems highly unlikely
that these folks, with much less political clout than Farris's homeschoolers and
Christian conservatives, could have stopped RLPA by themselves. One of my
most amusing memories is sitting at an anti-RLPA strategy meeting in 1998 at
the offices of the libertarian Cato Institute. With me at the table were Mike Far-
ris and Doug Domenech of HSLDA; Cardozo School of Law Professor Marci Ham-
ilton, who argued and won the Boerne case and was the driving intellectual force
against RFRA, RLPA, and RLUIPA; representatives from a group that advocates
mandatory vaccinations for children and opposes efforts by parents to oppose vac-
cinations on religious grounds; and representatives from another group that ad-
vocates easy access by social workers into homes to investigate claims of child
abuse and opposes efforts by religious parents to restrict or deny such access.
Farris, of course, has spent a significant chunk of his career litigating (and win-
ning) on behalf of parents against social workers who are suspicious about weird
homeschool families and want to enter their homes. He may have sued a few
mandatory-vaccination folks, too; I am not sure. Talk about politics and strange
bedfellows! Of course, the pro-RFRA meetings (in which I sometimes took part)




the only real hope for passage. Commerce came out 136 in the House
committee mark-up. Unfortunately for RLPA's supporters, however,
on the day after mark-up, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr re-
leased his report on President Bill Clinton.137 Congress was on its
way to impeachment proceedings. RLPA was lost in the shuffle and
dead for the rest of 1998.
When Congress returned in 1999, RLPA was re-introduced with
the Commerce Clause reinserted. 138 Farris and his conservative coa-
lition, although still opposed to this version of the bill, were focused on
other issues and significantly reduced the heat of their opposition. At
this point, however, the CFER began to split again, this time from the
liberal end of the coalition. The ACLU and other groups began to ad-
dress the question of religious exemptions to civil rights laws: specifi-
cally, what happens when religious landlords or employers claim the
right not to comply with laws that forbid them from discriminating on
basis of religion, marital status, or sexual orientation.139 The more
some of these organizations looked at this issue, the more certain they
were that they did not want across-the-board strict scrutiny protection
for free exercise claims, because they did not want the religious land-
lords and employers to win those cases. 140 This was very different
from the 1998 opposition from the right; while Farris and his con-
servative colleagues had strongly shared the desired goals of RLPA
and only disagreed on the chosen means, the new liberal struggles
went to the substance of religious freedom protection. Did RLPA's
erstwhile supporters really believe that all Americans should have the
advantage of strict scrutiny on their free exercise claims? For many,
the answer was "no."14 1
136. H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998). See The Library of Congress, Bill Summary &
Status for the 105th Congress, H.R. 4019 (1998), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bd-
query/D?dl05:1:./temp/-bdWdhl:&&&L&summ2=m&--/bss/dlO5query.html.
137. H.R. Doc. No. 105-310 (1998), available at http://icreport.access.gpo.gov/report/
lcover.htm.
138. H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999). See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?dl06:
1:./temp/-bdiroV:&&&L&summ2=m&-/bss/dlO6query.html.
139. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
140. It would not be unreasonable to ask why the ACLU and so many other politically
liberal groups maintained their support for comprehensive free exercise protec-
tion throughout the years of lobbying for RFRA and the first year of RLPA. Why
did it take them until 1999-almost the end of the Lobbying Nineties-to realize
that, in their scheme of priorities, some free exercise cases would be better de-
cided under Smith's lower level of protection? I have not been able to figure out
an answer to that question, unless it is simply that advocates for homosexuality
and other sexual conduct outside of marriage were more influential politically in
1999 than in 1990.




RLPA stalled, in limbo, for most of 1999 and 2000.142 Active con-
servative opposition had derailed the bill in 1998; now, although it
was passed by the House of Representatives by a wide margin on July
15, 1999, divisions with respect to civil rights laws had created a lack
of consensus that did not permit RLPA to move forward in the Senate
during 1999 and the first half of 2000. By the summer of 2000, Demo-
crat leaders in the Senate had taken a firm position against RLPA,143
and everyone was aware that a loss of Republican control of the Sen-
ate in the 2000 election was a distinct possibility.144 RLPA, or some
variation on RLPA, needed to be enacted by the end of July if it was to
be enacted at all, but RLPA could not pass the Senate in its then-
current form.
Just when it appeared that the Lobbying Nineties might end with
a fizzle, something amazing happened: almost overnight, the Phoenix
RLPA rose from its funeral pyre and morphed into a new creature-
RLUIPA. Still based primarily on the commerce and spending pow-
ers, as well as the "individualized assessments" opening left by Smith,
RLUIPA gave up the attempt at across-the-board free exercise protec-
tion. The debate over civil rights protections made that goal impossi-
ble. Instead, RLUIPA (as its name suggests) provides protection for
religious exercise in only two contexts: land use decisions and pris-
ons. 14 5 On May 11, 2000, CLS Executive Director Samuel B. Casey,
on behalf of the remaining RLPA Leadership Group, 146 wrote to Sen.
142. Because I was still working for HSLDA and Patrick Henry College in 1999 and
most of 2000, I was an outsider to the final evolution of RLPA into RLUIPA. My
thanks to Samuel B. Casey, my successor as Executive Director of the CLS, for
his help during a telephone conversation on June 14, 2004, in which he filled in
some of the gaps in my knowledge of this story.
143. Letter from Senators Tom Daschle, Edward Kennedy, Patrick Leahy and Joseph
Lieberman to Senator Orrin Hatch (Apr. 26, 2000) (on file with the NEBRASKA
LAW REVIEW).
144. This happened on June 5, 2001, when Vermont Senator James Jeffords switched
his party affiliation from Republican to Independent, giving the Democrats a 50-
49-1 majority.
145. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000). In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005),
the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that RLUIPA's prisoner provision, section
3, does not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2121. Interestingly, even
Justice Stevens, who had argued in Boerne that RFRA was an unconstitutional
establishment of religion, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37
(1997) (Stevens, J., concurring), joined in this conclusion. The Court specifically
did not rule on the constitutionality of the land use component of RLUIPA, sec-
tion 2, see Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2118 n.3, nor did it address the question of
whether RLUIPA might be unconstitutional on federalism grounds involving the
commerce power, the spending power, or the Tenth Amendment, Id. at 2120 n.7.
146. The American Jewish Congress, Family Research Council, Southern Baptist Con-
vention, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, National Associa-
tion of Evangelicals, United States Catholic Conference, Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints, Justice Fellowship, Prison Fellowship, CLS, Council on Re-
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Orrin G. Hatch,147 suggesting that in light of the political realities,
the Senator should work to enact RLUIPA rather than RLPA.
RLUIPA was introduced in both the House and the Senate on July 13,
2000. It was bottled up in the Senate Judiciary Committee until the
last day of the term, then suddenly released on July 27, 2000, where-
upon it passed the Senate by unanimous consent. Rep. Canady was
ready to move RLUIPA immediately to the House, where it was
passed by unanimous consent at 6:24 p.m. RLUIPA was signed by
President Clinton on September 22, 2000, bringing the Lobbying
Nineties to an end.
The land use section of RLUIPA was, in one sense, not surprising.
This was one area of free exercise law that just about everybody still
agreed on. Churches, synagogues, and mosques, as well as other relig-
ious uses for real property, often face significant opposition and hostil-
ity from local land use and zoning officials. This may be based on
antipathy toward religion; more often, however, the problem is the tax
exemption for religious property uses. If you are a city official, and
you know that a particular piece of property might either be used to
build a Wal-Mart, which will over the years pay an enormous amount
of tax revenue to the city, or to build a mega-church complex, which
will pay no taxes at all, which would you rather see in place? There
are plenty of stories from around the country of religious groups whose
ability to buy and build on land has been frustrated by local govern-
ment. The land use issue did not violate any other political taboos on
either the right or the left, so it was a natural choice for a revised,
limited free exercise bill. In another sense, however, there was at
least a slight irony about the inclusion of land use in RLUIPA, since
land use decisions typically involve individualized assessments, are
difficult to characterize as "generally applicable," and therefore pre-
sent one of the strongest arguments for ongoing application of the CSI/
LRM test under the post-Smith Free Exercise Clause.
Prisoners were, again in one sense, a more surprising choice for the
final legislation. 148 Throughout the years of lobbying for RFRA and
ligious Freedom, B'nai Brith International, General Council of Seventh-Day Ad-
ventists, Agudath Israel of America, Church of Christ Scientist, American Center
for Law & Justice, Christian Coalition, Focus on the Family, Association of Chris-
tian Schools International, and Council for Christian Colleges and Universities.
147. Letter from Samuel B. Casey to Senator Orrin G. Hatch (May 11, 2000) (on file
with the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW).
148. Final background disclosure: In August of 2000, right around the time that
RLUIPA was enacted into law, I left my employment at Patrick Henry College
and took a position with Justice Fellowship, the public policy arm of Chuck Col-
son's Prison Fellowship Ministries ("PFM"). PFM, of course, had taken a lead
role in advocating for RFRA and RLUIPA, and during my fairly brief time of
employment there I drafted a handbook on how to implement the new statute for
the benefit of prisoners. Copies are now available on-line. PRISON FELLOWSHIP
MINISTRIES, RELIGION BEHIND BARS: A HANDBOOK (2003), available at http://www.
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RLPA, the free exercise rights of prisoners had always been one of the
most contentious issues. Numerous prisoner exemption amendments
had been attempted over the years by various Senators and Repre-
sentatives. None of these had succeeded, but they had raised consid-
erable debate and controversy. It did seem to many people that
prisoners should not have the same level of protection for their relig-
ious practices as other people, because they are ... well, prisoners. Is
it not true that people give up some of their rights when they commit
crimes and go to prison? Should prison officials not have more flexibil-
ity in responding to demands for religious accommodations from pris-
oners than government officials have in generally responding to
religious claims by people who are not incarcerated? The response to
this was always that the meaning of "compelling state interest" and
"least restrictive means" is influenced by the situation, so that even if
the CSI/LRM test applies, prison officials will be able to meet it more
easily because of the unique safety and security concerns in a prison.
This kind of argument was sufficient to keep prisoners from being
exempted out of the broad free exercise protection of RFRA and RLPA
throughout the "Lobbying Nineties," but it fails to explain the amaz-
ing fact that when RLPA morphed into RLU1PA, religious prison-
ers1 49 were one of only two groups (the other being religious people
seeking land use decisions), out of all Americans, who were chosen for
free exercise protection under the CSI/LRM test. How could it be that
a state can deny the free exercise rights of a regular citizen by a mere
showing of "neutral law of general applicability," but, if that citizen
commits a felony and goes to a maximum-security prison, his free ex-
ercise claim is now raised to the much higher standard of strict scru-
tiny protection? Should prisoners have more religious liberty than
everyone else? Perhaps the fact that prisoners' lives are so totally reg-
ulated by government prison officials creates a need for strong protec-
tion for their religious practices, but this does not seem sufficient to
carry the day in Congress, especially given that prisoners are non-vot-
ers, the weakest of all constituency groups.
The inclusion of prisoners in RLUIPA can, I think, only be fully
understood in the context of the tremendous respect commanded by
Chuck Colson. Colson, formerly one of President Richard Nixon's
chief perpetrators of dirty tricks, went to prison and gave his life to
Christ before founding Prison Fellowship Ministries. His self-sacrifi-
cial life and commitment to the principles of justice, mercy, and faith-
fulness 150 have made Colson an honored statesman both inside
political circles in Washington and in the Christian community na-
pfm. org/Content/ContentGroups/Justice- Fellowship2/Resources/2723religion
behindbars.pdf.




tionwide. Colson has fought for years for the rights of prisoners, and
it was his commitment and involvement that led to the otherwise-in-
explicable inclusion of prisoners in the final version of RLUIPA.
Within a matter of weeks in the summer of 2000, RLPA was con-
verted into RLUIPA and swept through Congress without significant
opposition. RLUIPA passed both the Senate and the House by unani-
mous voice vote within hours on July 27, 2000,151 and was signed into
law by President Clinton on September 22, 2000.152 The Lobbying
Nineties had come to an end. Many years of labor had been invested,
and the fruits were significantly less than most advocates had antici-
pated and hoped for. RFRA's state-law applications were held to be
unconstitutional, although there was at least reasonable hope that the
courts would still apply it with regard to federal law. The effort to
enact comprehensive federal protection for free exercise of religion in
cases involving state law had failed, but RLUIPA at least provided
protection for land use disputes and for prisoners-provided such pro-
tection, that is, pending decisions by the Supreme Court on RLUIPA's
constitutionality. Cutter v. Wilkinson153 provided a partial answer as
to the fate of RLUIPA, but other constitutional challenges are likely to
follow.
V. WHAT NEXT?
Up to this point, this Article has been mostly a history lesson, with
a little bit of free exercise theory thrown in. What remains is the more
practical question: proposing some possible approaches that could be
used by Congress if there were any political will to add to current
levels of protection for free exercise of religion.
Is there any such political will?154 Probably not. The 1990s fights
over RFRA, RLPA, and RLUIPA seemed to have used up all political
capital in Washington over religious freedom issues. No Senators or
Representatives-at least none of whom I am aware-have made any
speeches or campaign promises about bills to protect religious freedom
since RLUIPA was enacted in 2000. Indeed, even the advocacy
groups, whose concerted efforts were so important to the passage of
RFRA and RLUIPA, have been largely silent on this issue for the past
151. S. 2869, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 4862, 106th Cong. (2000). See http://thomas.
loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/ld 106:1: ./temp/-bd6XFE:@@@L&summ2=m&-/bss/
dl06query.html.
152. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000). See link to http://thomas.loc.gov, supra note
151.
153. 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005).
154. I am a law professor, not a professional lobbyist or a political scientist, so my
views on issues such as political viability must be regarded as those of a moder-
ately-informed amateur.
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three years,155 after a decade in which calls for new legislation to pro-
tect religious practice were pretty much constant staples in the fund-
raising and informational mailings of groups from across the political
spectrum.
Things can always change in Washington, however; so, just for fun,
let us think about what might be done if federal legislation to protect
religious liberty were to become viable once again. What kinds of pro-
posals might we put on the table?
A. Constitutional Amendment
Of course, the real issue behind RFRA, RLPA, and RLUIPA was
disagreement with the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, and there
are only three ways of permanently correcting a bad constitutional de-
cision by the Supreme Court:
(1) allow enough time for Justices to be replaced on the Court by
other Justices with different views, so that the Court eventually
overrules its prior decision; 15 6
(2) use critical scholarly writings and public outcry to convince at
least a Justice or two that a recent decision was wrong, so that
the Court overrules itself in a fairly short time period;15 7 or
(3) enact a constitutional amendment under the process set forth in
Article V.158
Option (1) might happen some day but, by definition, it requires
significant passage of time and changes in Court personnel, so it is not
155. For example, as a former chief executive of CLS, a former employee of PFM, and
a former member of the Board of Directors of NAE, I read a lot of newsletters,
action-oriented fund appeals, and e-mail alerts from all three of those organiza-
tions. To the best of my memory, not one e-mail or mailing from any of those
groups since 2000 has even hinted at efforts to propose further federal free exer-
cise legislation. In the case of Prison Fellowship, it is easy to see why this is the
case: RLUIPA dealt specifically with PFM's core issue, prisoners' religious
rights, so as long as RLUIPA is good law there is no need to look elsewhere. How-
ever, both CLS and NAE advocated strongly for broad-based religious freedom
protection in RFRA and RLPA, and I am confident that the policy-makers at both
organizations are less than satisfied with the final results of the Lobbying Nine-
ties. Their silence on this issue, as well as the silence of other religious liberty
advocates from across the political spectrum, seems to indicate that the
RFRA-RLPA-RLUIPA coalition has used up its political resources, and that con-
gressional doors are not open to any further efforts along these lines at this time.
156. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate but equal
accommodations), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring sep-
arate but equal accommodations in public schools to be unconstitutional).
157. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). However, this does not al-
ways work, even when it may appear that criticism of the earlier decision is so
powerful as to give the Court reason to rethink its position. See Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
158. Cf. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793); U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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very helpful in thinking about short-term corrections. Option (2) may
have some promise, and the Smith decision has generated lots of criti-
cal scholarship,159 but the Court's decisions in Lukumi and Boerne
suggest that the current Court majority is pretty committed to Smith
as the correct approach to the Free Exercise Clause.1 60
Of these three options, option (3), a constitutional amendment, is
the surest and most direct method to restore a higher level of protec-
tion for religious freedom. The language of an amendment might be
something like this:
Neither the federal government nor any state or local government may burden
any person's exercise of religion unless the government action imposing the
burden is a necessary means to accomplish a compelling government
interest. 161
There are a couple of problems. One is that amendments are much
more difficult to enact then simple federal legislation,16 2 and so the
level of necessary support in Congress and state legislatures is consid-
erable-which, in turn, requires considerable public support and lob-
bying energy for an amendment to be viable. A constitutional
amendment to correct the Smith decision was considered by the coali-
tion in 1990-91, and again after the Boerne decision in 1997-98, but
both times this path was rejected on the belief that advocates could
not generate sufficiently powerful public support on a complex issue
like free exercise of religion-never an easy topic to explain to most
audiences!163-to make it possible for an amendment to be proposed
by super-majorities in Congress and ratified by seventy-five percent of
the states. Given the fact that free exercise protection has largely dis-
appeared from public view since 2000, that pessimistic assessment
159. See, e.g., supra notes 13, 62 and 78; see also Duncan, supra note 76; Edward Mc-
Glynn Gaffhey, Jr., The Religion Clause: A Double Guarantee of Religious Lib-
erty, 1993 BYU L. REV. 189; Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise,
1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
160. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1997); Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
161. I am suggesting this language merely to get the concept of a constitutional
amendment on the table. If an amendment were to be actively pursued, lots of
input and interaction by constitutional scholars and practitioners would be
needed to fine-tune the text.
162. Absent the never-yet-used and unpredictable route of a constitutional convention,
Article V requires an affirmative vote of two-thirds of both houses of Congress,
followed by ratification by three-quarters of the states. This process has only
produced twenty-seven amendments in over 200 years, and many proposals with
fairly broad popular support have died short of ratification.
163. For those who have never tried it, I will ask you to take my word that standing in
front of a church group or other audience not composed of lawyers or law students
and explaining the difference between the compelling government interest/least
restrictive means test and the neutral law of general applicability approach is
exceeded in difficulty only by the challenge of convincing the members of that
audience that they should care about any of this.
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must surely remain true today, and it will continue to be true unless
some breathtaking Court decision or other hot news item dramatically
changes the perceived urgency of the issue.
Also, a constitutional amendment is an uncertain thing. It might
be interpreted by the courts to produce results that none of its advo-
cates expected-and, once the difficult amendment process has been
completed, only another difficult amendment process could fix any
problems. The stakes would be very high, and even thoughtfully-
drafted language could open an unexpected Pandora's Box. There are
some good reasons why amendments make most lawyers and policy-
makers nervous.
B. Re-Enacting RFRA
One proposal that was briefly bandied about and then rejected in
the wake of Boerne was that of encouraging Congress to simply re-
enact RFRA exactly in its original form, based on congressional power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. What, you may ask,
could possibly be gained by such a course of action, when the Supreme
Court had already once held that RFRA, as applied to the states, ex-
ceeded congressional power under Section 5? This is a reasonable
question, and it was the outrageousness and probable futility of the
proposal that led to its being removed from the list of options pretty
quickly in 1997. However, there could be a couple of potential benefits
from re-enacting RFRA:
(1) Like the petition for rehearing filed after the Smith decision in
1990, re-enacting RFRA would be a petition for the Supreme
Court to reconsider Boerne. It would send the message that the
other two branches of the federal government both believe that
the Court was wrong in Boerne, and that Congress does have the
power under Section 5 to expand individual freedoms 1 64 beyond
what the Court has defined in interpreting (or misinterpreting)
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of
course, Congress and the President expressed the same convic-
tion when they enacted RFRA the first time and the Supreme
Court was not much impressed, so there is little reason to think
that re-enactment would produce a different result absent a
change of personnel on the Court.
(2) There are still some who believe (Marbury v. Madison16 5 and "[it
is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment, to say what the law iS"166 notwithstanding) that Congress
as a coordinate branch of the federal government has just as
164. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).
165. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
166. Id. at 177.
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much right and duty to interpret and apply the Constitution in
its sphere of activity (enacting legislation) as the Supreme Court
does in its domain (deciding cases between litigants).167
Respected Presidents, including Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jack-
son, and Abraham Lincoln,168 have expressed variations on this
theme. If this approach is correct, then the Supreme Court
should be extremely reluctant to declare a federal statute uncon-
stitutional unless it blatantly, explicitly violates some provision
of the Constitution,169 and Congress should be treated as having,
in general, the final say on the constitutionality of a federal stat-
ute.170 Re-enactment of RFRA could be valuable if a substantial
number of Senators and Representatives wanted to push this po-
sition. It could even be coupled with an executive order from the
President instructing the Justice Department and other execu-
tive branch officers to enforce RFRA in spite of Boerne. Is this
going to happen? Probably not in today's environment, with the
end of the Lobbying Nineties and the loss of political momentum
after the enactment of RLUIPA.
C. The Commerce and Spending Power
The major innovation that RLPA and RLUIPA brought to the stat-
utory protection of religious liberty was the use of Congress's power to
spend 17 1 and to regulate foreign, interstate, and Native American
commerce, 172 both under Article I, Section 8. Given the strict limita-
tions established by the Supreme Court in Boerne on Congress's abil-
ity to expand individual freedoms under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the supporters of RLPA and later RLUIPA sought to es-
167. See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 985-86
(1987) ("The Supreme Court, then, is not the only interpreter of the Constitution.
Each of the three coordinate branches of government created and empowered by
the Constitution-the executive and legislative no less than the judicial-has a
duty to interpret the Constitution in the performance of its official functions.");
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 83 GEo. L.J. 217, 228-62, 292-321 (1994); Michael Stokes Paul-
sen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After Twenty-five Years, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 1337, 1349-58 (1999); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of
Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2724-31 (2003).
168. CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RECON-
STRUCTION 25 (2001).
169. Of course, it would be highly unusual for Congress to enact such a thing.
170. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
171. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.").
172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
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tablish federal power under the Spending and Commerce Clauses. 173
The restrictions on state and local government-specifically, that gov-
ernment not substantially burden religious exercise without a compel-
ling interest or by using means that are not the least restrictive-
were triggered by government activities that (i) receive any federal
funding, or (ii) would affect "commerce with foreign nations, among
the several States, or with Indian tribes."' 74 The tools of commerce
and spending power remain potentially available and could be used
more broadly than they were in RLUIPA.
1. Spending Power
Could Congress add to RLUIPA's short list other religious activi-
ties that would be protected from government interference by strict
scrutiny if some form of federal spending touches the religious activ-
ity? Indeed, could Congress revive RLPA's approach of requiring
strict scrutiny for all free exercise claims where federal spending is
involved? It is not clear that this would be successful, although the
Court has said that "objectives not thought to be within Article I's
'enumerated legislative fields,' may nevertheless be attained through
the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal
funds." 1 7 5
In the leading Supreme Court case dealing with the spending
power, South Dakota v. Dole,1 7 6 the Court upheld a federal statute
directing the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a small percent-
age of certain federal highway funds from any state that did not raise
its minimum drinking age to twenty-one. Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote that there is a four-part test to determine whether Congress
may impose a condition on the states to receipt of federal funding:177
* First, the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of "the
general welfare." Courts should "defer substantially to the judg-
ment of Congress" on the question of general public purpose. Each
underlying federal spending provision which would be affected by
the new religious liberty statute would need to meet this standard,
but it is not a particularly difficult standard to meet.
" Second, Congress must unambiguously state the condition on fed-
eral funding, so that states know the consequences of accepting the
money. Presumably a new federal statute stating unambiguously
that all federally-funded programs would in the future contain a
173. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000); Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA) of
1998, H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. 57-62; S. 2148, 105th Cong. 57-62 (1998).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2).
175. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citations ommitted).
176. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
177. Id. at 207-08.
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requirement of strict scrutiny in the face of free exercise claims
would put the states on clear notice that they must comply with
the CSI/LRM standard. Just as RFRA, dealing with the federal
government, acts as a universal amendment to every provision of
the United States Code,178 so this new spending power religious
freedom statute would amend all federal grants of money to the
states, requiring the recipients to administer the funded programs
in accordance with CSJ!LRM religious freedom standards.
* Skipping ahead for a moment, the fourth prong of the Dole test
states that the conditional grant of funds must not be barred by
any other constitutional provision. Unlike Dole, where the
Twenty-first Amendment was in question, there does not appear to
be any other provision of the Constitution that would prohibit the
use of the spending power to promote religious liberty, unless Jus-
tice Stevens was right in Boerne that RFRA violated the Establish-
ment Clause179-and, fortunately, there is no indication that any
other Justice agrees with Stevens on that point. The Court major-
ity clearly believes that the Constitution does not require strict
scrutiny for free exercise claims,1SO and it will not permit Congress
to impose strict scrutiny unless there is some source of power other
than Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to support it, 181 but
other than Stevens' Establishment Clause concerns it does not
seem likely that a federal statutory right created under another
congressional power would be unconstitutional.
" The tricky part of the Dole test in this context would be the third
prong, which requires that the conditions placed on the grant
money must be related to the federal interest in particular na-
tional projects or programs. Justice O'Connor, in her Dole dissent,
placed particular emphasis on this "reasonably related" test.1 8 2
What would be the relationship between a federal grant to build
highways, for example, or pay for school lunches, and a require-
ment that the state-recipient provide higher protection for relig-
ious liberty? In the absence of a change in Supreme Court
personnel (probably a change significant enough to call either
Smith or Boerne into question), it seems unlikely that such a broad
measure to restore religious freedom under the spending power
would survive the Dole analysis.
Even if the Court were to uphold such a use of the spending power,
it would be a limited power. The federal government puts money into
178. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and
the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249 (1995).
179. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
180. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
181. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
182. Dole, 483 U.S. at 212-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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many areas of state and local government, but far from all. A spend-
ing power-based religious freedom statute would always leave signifi-
cant areas of religious activity unprotected from state or local
governmental interference. Under current law, however, such a stat-
ute would be unlikely to survive.
2. Commerce Power
For some sixty years, from the New Deal183 until the mid-1990s,184
it was conventional legal wisdom in the United States that the Com-
merce Clause gave Congress virtually unlimited power to regulate any
area of human activity. While the national government was still theo-
retically one of limited, enumerated powers,18 5 in practice the sub-
stantive reach of the federal government was taken as virtually
limitless. Since virtually any type of conduct, if aggregated together
with enough similar conduct by other citizens, could be seen as exert-
ing "a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce," 18 6 virtu-
ally everything-education, healthcare, retirement income, private
discrimination, etc.-became fair game for federal regulation.
Throughout the twentieth century, there were many who disagreed
with this concept of unlimited national power.' 8 7 Today, it is unclear
whether Lopez and Morrison1 8 8 mark (i) the beginning of a major
turning point for the Supreme Court, back toward a conception of lim-
ited national power, or (ii) just a blip on the constitutional radar
screen showing that commerce power has extreme outer limits, but
placing negligible practical constraints on Congress's ability to main-
tain the modern regulatory state.1 8 9 Of the current Supreme Court
Justices, only Clarence Thomas has indicated a clear desire to signifi-
cantly retrench federal commerce power. 19 0
183. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
184. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
185. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
186. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
187. Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Converse-1983" in Context, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1994).
188. See supra note 130.
189. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38
ARiz. L. REV. 793 (1996); Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist
Court: A Normative Defense, 574 ANNALs AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 24 (2001);
Herman Schwartz, The Supreme Court's Federalism: Fig Leaf for Conservatives,
574 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 119 (2001); Donald H. Zeigler, The New
Activist Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
190. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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As discussed above in Part IV, it was differing views of the appro-
priate use of the commerce power that split the conservative camp
over RLPA in 1998.191 There are certainly strong reasons why one
who believes in federalism and limited national government might re-
sist the use of commerce power to achieve various social goals through
federal legislation, even when the social goal is something as impor-
tant as protecting free exercise of religion. However, for those who are
not burdened with a concern about expansive federal power, the Com-
merce Clause provides a strong potential vehicle to extend RFRA-like
coverage to situations beyond land use and prisoners. Lopez and Mor-
rison suggest some outer limits on that power if applied to situations
where there is no real connection to interstate commerce, but a statu-
tory "jurisdictional element"19 2 like that in RLUIPA would increase
the likelihood of a more broadly-based religious freedom statute being
upheld under the commerce power. As long as the statute is only trig-
gered by religious conduct, or restrictions on religious conduct, that
materially affect interstate commerce, there is every reason to think
that the legislation will be upheld, even post-Lopez and post-Morrison,
as an appropriate use of the commerce power. Whether this is a good
idea is a very different question.
D. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
When the Supreme Court determined in Boerne that broad relig-
ious freedom protection exceeds congressional power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 193 it left open the possibility of more
limited legislation that was clearly tied to the Court's definition of free
exercise, "congruent and proportional" to actual constitutional viola-
tions under the Court's Smith test, and supported by specific factual
findings.19 4 This suggests that some sub-set of issues in the religious
freedom arena might constitutionally be protected under Section 5 if
Congress can keep those issues specific and provide strong evidence
that its statute is remedial. The idea would be to create a laser beam,
narrowly focused at a specific problem or set of problems, since the
scatter-gun approach of RFRA did not survive the Court's scrutiny.
Congress could pick any particular free exercise issue, hold hear-
ings, make findings, and tailor an appropriate statutory response.
One area of law that would probably work well here is the problem of
religious exemptions to state and local anti-discrimination laws that
force religious employers and landlords to hire and rent, respectively,
in violation of their religious conscience. The paradigm case might be
a landlord living in half of a duplex home and holding out the other
191. See supra Part IV.
192. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
193. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
194. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
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half for rent, and denying a lease to a homosexual couple or an unmar-
ried heterosexual couple whose lifestyle violates the landlord's relig-
ious convictions. If a state or local statute forbids housing
discrimination on the basis of "sexual orientation" or "marital sta-
tus,"195 the argument can be made that the landlord must rent in
spite of his or her religious convictions-and, indeed, some cases have
reached that unfortunate conclusion.19 6 With an appropriate amount
of Congressional research and fact-finding, a statute narrowly tailored
to prevent constitutional violations by protecting religious landlords,
and perhaps employers, under the CSI/LRM test might well survive
the Court's scrutiny under Boerne.19 7 Of course, it was precisely this
issue that caused the RLPA coalition to splinter in 1999-2000,198 and
such an attempt would undoubtedly raise significant opposition from
the political left.
E. Strengthening Free Exercise Using Smith
One other potential legislative approach to the protection of relig-
ious exercise would be to attempt to strengthen and elaborate on the
constitutional protection that the Court left in place in Smith. Al-
though constitutional free exercise after Smith is much more limited
than it was before, it is not nothing, and Congress could conceivably
legislate to put more meat on the protections of Smith and draw atten-
tion to their availability.
At one level, this is very unattractive. Those of us who advocate for
new religious liberty legislation are, almost by definition, unhappy
with the Supreme Court's revisionist free exercise jurisprudence.
There is something almost unseemly about seizing on the Smith rules
and carving them into legislative stone, even in an effort to strengthen
them. On the other hand, legislation is not carved into stone; it can
always be revised or repealed if the underlying legal environment
changes. In addition, Smith gives no indication of disappearing any
time in the near future. If Congress were able to pass legislation that
strengthens and develops free exercise protection in a way sufficiently
close to Smith's holding to encourage the Court to uphold its constitu-
195. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 5, 8, 14, 16, 20-22 (2003); CAL. GOVT CODE
§ 12900 (West 2005).
196. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
197. Note, of course, that applying a statutory CSI/LRM test would not necessarily
mean that the religious landlord would win. For example, if a landlord engaged
in racial discrimination by reason of sincere but misguided religious conviction,
the strong public policy against racial discrimination would undoubtedly provide
a compelling government interest. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574 (1983). In the unlikely case that the religious landlord's apartment was the
only available housing, so that the unmarried couple might otherwise have no
suitable place to live, that might also constitute a compelling interest.
198. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
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tionality, it might be a way to make the best of a bad situation. How
might this be done?199
1. Belief
First, the Court in Smith reiterated the longstanding doctrine that
although the government may regulate religious conduct in some cir-
cumstances, it may never attempt to regulate religious belief as such.
Perhaps legislation could identify some areas of activity that, in Con-
gress's view, are so integrally tied with belief itself that they are enti-
tled to absolute protection, or at least CSI/LRM protection, because
they are so fundamental that regulating them is the functional
equivalent of regulating belief itself. Selection of pastors by churches
and teachers by religious schools might fall into this category. Some
possible language:
Government shall honor and protect a religious person's absolute right to be-
lieve. The right to believe encompasses the right to form, hold, and inculcate
beliefs. Accordingly:
(1) No government shall regulate the selection or employment of persons
exercising spiritual authority within a religious association.
(2) No government shall regulate the selection or employment of teachers
in religious education.
(3) No government shall regulate or review thecurriculum in religious
education.
The Court has said repeatedly that the right to believe is absolute.
Whether a statute like this one should maintain that absolute protec-
tion, or temper it with a CSI/LRM test, is an interesting question.
2. Laws That Are Not Neutral and Generally Applicable
Under Smith, the government wins when it applies "neutral laws
of general applicability" against religious believers.200 However, if a
law is not neutral or not generally applicable and violates a person's
religious convictions, the CSI/LRM test may come into play. As dis-
cussed above, 20 1 situations in which the government makes individu-
alized assessments and evaluations may qualify as non-neutral laws
and therefore permit strict scrutiny for religious believers. Congress
could enact legislation to affirm this point and suggest some situations
in which it might apply. For example:
199. The following ideas were developed when I was working at HSLDA in 1998-99 in
an effort to propose alternatives to RLPA without using the Commerce Clause.
We developed a draft of a bill that we called the Religious Exercise And Liberty
("REAL") Act, which never went anywhere. I thank Michael P. Farris, Founder
of HSLDA and President of Patrick Henry College, and Scott Somerville, HSLDA
staff attorney, who worked with me on these proposals.
200. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-81
(1990).
201. Duncan, supra note 76; see also supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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Government shall honor and protect the right of the free exercise of religion
when it is burdened by a law that is not a neutral law of general applicability.
(1) A governmental rule, program, policy, or practice is not generally ap-
plicable if it permits exceptions, exemptions, or variances for any
reason.
(2) A law is not neutral if it categorizes religious persons, practices, or
structures. This includes, but is not limited to, zoning or land use
laws that categorize places of religious worship or education.
(3) Any designation of a religious site or structure as a landmark or his-
torical site is not neutral. This includes any governmental designa-
tion of individual sites or structures pursuant to a law that does not
by its terms refer to religious persons, practices, or structures.
(4) Religious believers may propose less restrictive alternatives to laws
that are not neutral or not generally applicable, and governments
shall permit religious believers to select such alternatives unless the
government demonstrates that the alternative would prevent the gov-
ernment from achieving a compelling interest.
(5) Any governmental rule, program, policy, or practice that permits ex-
emptions for medical reasons shall be presumed to also permit exemp-
tions for religious reasons.
3. Hybrid Rights
As discussed above,2 0 2 the "hybrid rights exception" is one of the
most puzzling parts of Smith. No one quite knows what it means.
Some believe 20 3 that it was simply an unpersuasive attempt to ex-
plain away cases such as Yoder 2O4 without overruling them. If hybrid
rights are real, no one is quite sure which rights work and which ones
do not. Congress could adopt legislation stating what other rights
count as hybrid rights-the Court might not buy Congress's conclu-
sion, but it would at least be evidence of the opinion of a co-equal
branch on the topic.
One enormous problem here is the politics. Every Senator, every
Representative, every lobbyist, and every advocacy group, conserva-
tive or liberal, will have his, her, or its own list of rights that should or
should not be available to trigger strict scrutiny in hybrid rights cases.
The RFRA debate in 1991-92 reminds us that both the right to abor-
tion and the right to life will have very strong advocates, pro and con.
Gay rights? Rights of parents to raise and educate children without
government interference? Children's rights? Animal rights? Gun
rights? It's pretty frightening. A congressional effort to define the
universe of appropriate religious hybrids could be one of the nastiest
bloodbaths ever seen on the Hill. It would probably be best to leave
this one alone.
202. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
203. Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smit." Toward a Unified
Theory of First Amendment Exemptions From Neutral Laws of General Applica-
bility, 66 Mo. L. REV. 9 (2001); see also supra note 78.




After thirty years of relative calm in the world of religious liberty
advocacy, the decade of the 1990s was a frenetic period of lobbying,
legislating, and litigating. The final results of all this activity were
probably less than satisfying for most of those involved:
* Smith reduced constitutional protection for religious exercise from
the high standard of compelling state interest/least restrictive
means to a lesser standard that requires only neutral laws of gen-
eral applicability.
* RFRA's attempt to restore high protection by legislation was held
unconstitutional in Boerne, at least in its state-law applications.
" RLPA's second attempt to restore broad protection by statute dis-
integrated over various political concerns.
* The final compromise bill, RLUIPA, identifies only two specific ar-
eas of law for application of strict scrutiny, leaving other religious
believers unprotected. RLUIPA has survived its first constitu-
tional test in the Supreme Court,20 5 but it could be challenged
again on other grounds. If constitutional, RLUIPA will help in a
limited set of free exercise cases, but there are many other cases
involving state interference with religious practice that remain
subject only to the limited protection of Smith's "neutral law of
general applicability" methodology.
There are no indications that Congress has any interest in another
religious liberty bill, and the fracturing of the CFER during the RLPA/
RLUIPA debates makes future legislation much more problematic.
No longer can it be said, as it could in 1993, that the vast majority of
those with an interest in religious freedom are in substantial agree-
ment about what Congress should do. The lack of a unified front, and
the potential partisan divisions over issues like exemptions from civil
rights laws, could make it unlikely that Congress will act again. The
Lobbying Nineties are over.
The only sure ways to "fix" Smith are (i) a change of heart by the
Supreme Court (possibly sparked by one or more changes in personnel
on the Court), or (ii) a constitutional amendment. Amendments have
the potential to take the religious freedom policy decision out of the
hands of an unsympathetic Court, but they are politically very diffi-
cult and have the potential to cause problems that might be both un-
foreseen and very difficult to correct.
Any future attempt to promote free exercise by regular legislation
could involve: (i) a statute based on some enumerated power of Con-
gress such as the power to spend or to regulate interstate commerce,
applied as in RLPA to promote free exercise broadly; (ii) a statute
passed under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that is a nar-
205. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005); see also supra note 145.
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rowly tailored remedy for specific constitutional violations so as to
survive scrutiny under Boerne; or (iii) a statute that draws its heart
from the Smith decision itself and attempts to strengthen and widen
the protections remaining in the Court's free exercise jurisprudence.
In the final analysis, none of these approaches appear either politi-
cally viable or likely to accomplish their objectives. For the near fu-
ture, religious liberty advocates may have to take the statutory law as
it stands and attempt to strengthen their position through litigation.
Perhaps the Supreme Court, if given the right opportunities to do so,
will look for opportunities to announce that Smith's report of the
death of free exercise was greatly exaggerated.
